Organised crime in Australia 2015 by Australian Crime Commission

Correspondence should be addressed to: 
Chief Executive Officer 
Australian Crime Commission 
PO Box 1936 Canberra City 
ACT 2601
Telephone: 
02 6243 6666 (from within Australia) 
61 2 6243 6666 (international)
Facsimile: 
02 6243 6687 (from within Australia) 
61 2 6243 6687 (international)
Published May 2015
© Commonwealth of Australia 2015.
This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part 
may be reproduced by any process without written permission from the Chief Executive Officer, 
Australian Crime Commission.
ISSN 2202-3925
1ORGANISED CRIME IN AUSTRALIA 2015 
AUSTRALIAN CRIME COMMISSION
2ORGANISED CRIME IN AUSTRALIA 2015 
AUSTRALIAN CRIME COMMISSION
ORGANISED CRIME IN AUSTRALIA 2015 
AUSTRALIAN CRIME COMMISSION
Organised Crime in Australia 2015 is the Australian Crime 
Commission’s biennial public report that delivers a current picture of 
the serious and organised crime environment in Australia. It outlines 
the existing and emerging organised crime threats impacting the 
Australian community and national interests. 
 
Serious and organised crime is growing in sophistication and constantly adopting new 
and advanced technologies to undertake illegal activities. It exploits the internet and 
other technologies to target the community through activities such as online scams, 
cybercrime and the theft of personal identity information stored electronically. It is 
expanding its reach globally and injecting itself into new markets—both legitimate and 
illegitimate—in order to increase its opportunities to generate illicit wealth. It works to 
conceal unlawfully derived profits, seeking to intermingle those funds with legitimately 
earned money. 
These activities significantly affect the wellbeing of families and communities across 
Australia. Serious and organised crime diverts funds out of the legitimate economy and 
undermines the profitability of lawful businesses. It removes large amounts of money 
from the Australian economy that could otherwise be used to fund services, roads, 
hospitals and schools. This money is instead lining the pockets of criminals. 
The presence of organised crime and its impact on the community is pervasive and 
law enforcement and partners are working together to ensure our activities are well 
coordinated and cohesive. 
CEO FOREWORD 
MR CHRIS DAWSON APM
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The Australian Crime Commission’s work is critical in determining how Australia 
responds to the threat of serious and organised crime. We work across borders to 
discover, understand and respond to the highest risk serious and organised crime 
threats. 
  We proactively discover new and emerging threats and fill the gaps in our 
intelligence. 
  We maintain a national intelligence picture on current and emerging threats, 
supported by our partners, to understand the organised crime environment and its 
impact on the community. We use this intelligence to inform our responses to serious 
and organised crime.
  We respond to the serious and organised crime threat by disrupting, disabling and 
dismantling criminal enterprises through effective enforcement, regulation, policy 
and legislation. 
Our priority is to reduce the impact of serious and organised crime on the community, 
by making it harder for criminals to operate in Australia and by eliminating vulnerabilities 
that organised criminals seek to exploit. 
This report aims to inform the Australian community of the current and emerging 
organised crime threats that may directly or indirectly impact our nation. Members of 
the community are encouraged to report suspicious activities that could be linked to 
serious and organised crime by contacting their local police or by calling Crime Stoppers. 
As serious and organised crime impacts all of us, it is important that we work together 
to discover, understand and respond to the threats of most harm to Australians and our 
national interests. 
Chris Dawson APM 
Chief Executive Officer 
Australian Crime Commission 
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INTRODUCTION
What does organised crime look like?
The term ‘organised crime’ often conjures up stereotypical images—whether they 
be of the Mafia-type brotherhoods controlling large-scale crime rackets such as drug 
trafficking and money laundering, or of highly visible outlaw motorcycle gangs. In 
Australia, these depictions are still highly relevant, but there is also a less visible face of 
organised crime, which can be camouflaged within the community and harder to detect. 
For example, fraudulent investment schemes may be accompanied by glossy brochures, 
seminars or webinars and be promoted through slick websites, making them appear to 
be legitimate, even to the most financially literate members of the community. Many 
serious and organised crime groups present and operate as authentic businesses.
Advancing technologies and the online environment have presented new opportunities 
for organised crime to take advantage of our society’s reliance on the Internet and 
automation. Cybercrime acts against individuals, businesses and governments, can be 
conducted from anywhere around the world, and can be easily carried out by individuals, 
organised crime groups or nation states. Defending the Internet against civilian and 
military intruders is now a high-priority global security problem. In November 2014, 
the Director of the United States National Security Agency told the House Intelligence 
Committee that some nation states had allegedly infiltrated the computers of critical 
industries (such as the electricity grid) to steal information and gather intelligence 
that could be used in the planning of an attack or to further advance malicious acts or 
interests, and warned of the ongoing risk of organised crime groups acting as proxies for 
nation states.
7ORGANISED CRIME IN AUSTRALIA 2015 
AUSTRALIAN CRIME COMMISSION
Organised crime groups involved in international drug trafficking are diversifying. 
No longer trading in one drug or commodity, some groups have begun trafficking 
in a number of commodities, including multiple drug types in the same shipment. 
Cooperation between organised crime groups is becoming more apparent, as is the 
intertwining of different types of criminal activities being undertaken by some organised 
crime groups.
Of particular significance in 2015 is the continuing threat of terrorism. The problem 
of Australians going abroad to fight is an emerging area of complexity for this country. 
As counter-terrorism efforts throughout Australia are enhanced, the linkages between 
terrorism and the broader organised crime and volume crime environments are being 
identified. These linkages include, but are not limited to, Australians who finance 
terrorist activities, Australians who leave Australia to support terrorist causes, and who 
may return to Australia with the intent of inflicting harm on the Australian community, 
or may be recruited by organised crime groups seeking the specialist skill sets they 
developed in foreign conflicts. 
 
What are the key characteristics of organised crime?
In the current Australian environment, serious and organised crime is exploiting three 
key capabilities in particular:
1. The ability to conceal criminal activity by integrating into legitimate markets 
Serious and organised crime has become interwoven with our economic, social 
and political environments. Although organised crime has continued to operate 
in traditional illicit markets, such as the illicit drug markets, it has been innovative 
in infiltrating legitimate industries to yield and launder significant criminal profits. 
In some instances, organised crime has sought to infiltrate specific industries to 
further its own activities, for example by setting up businesses within the transport, 
resources or investment sectors.
2. Technology and online capabilities 
The uptake of new technologies by serious and organised crime reflects the adoption 
of these technologies by the general public. Serious and organised criminals have 
proven themselves adept at identifying and exploiting new and emerging technologies 
to facilitate their crime, to expand their reach, and to provide them with the 
anonymity and distance from their crime which makes it difficult for law enforcement 
to detect and identify them.
 The ability to harness new and emerging technology to criminal ends is so 
fundamental to the success of high-level serious and organised crime entities that 
many employ specialists ‘in-house’, or contract their technology requirements to 
other groups who specialise in the provision of illicit technology services, or simply 
purchase ready-made malicious software to conduct criminal activity.
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3. The globalisation of organised crime 
Serious and organised crime is necessarily transnational and global in nature. 
Although individuals and groups involved in serious and organised crime will always 
vary in their capabilities, geographical reach and sophistication, there are groups, 
networks and individuals operating at an ‘elite’ criminal level and targeting illicit 
markets in a number of countries simultaneously. They are highly networked, 
highly professional and extremely well funded, and they operate with high-level 
specialist advice—including legal and financial advice—that allows them either to 
evade detection or to operate within the gaps in legislative and regulatory regimes 
internationally.
 Transnational organised crime groups have the ability to adapt to market 
requirements and demands. They have capitalised on the high level of demand in 
Australia for methylamphetamine (particularly crystal methylamphetamine, or ‘ice’). 
In the recent past, the methylamphetamine market has been dominated by domestic 
production. Significant production is still occurring domestically, but there has 
recently been a sharp increase in detections of methylamphetamine at the Australian 
border, suggesting that transnational organised crime groups have identified a gap in 
the market which they can fill.
How does organised crime affect us?
Organised crime affects the community in a number ways—for example, there is a 
financial cost to governments in identifying, investigating, prosecuting and preventing 
it, and it can harm the national economy by pushing out legitimate business or eroding 
public confidence in the banking, finance or investment sectors.
Serious and organised crime also causes harms to the community that cannot be 
measured by a dollar value. For example, those affected by illicit drug use and their 
families may suffer severe physical and emotional anguish, and those who have lost their 
life savings to fraud may suffer not just financially but also psychologically from their loss. 
Organised revenue and taxation fraud, including the use of complex business structures 
and phoenixing,1 deprives government of the funds needed to provide essential services 
such as hospitals, schools, roads and public transport.
In many cases, Australians are exposed to organised crime through the Internet. 
Cybercrime, predominantly the criminal use of malware, can target individuals and 
businesses, compromising their computer systems to steal data, or encrypting it and 
holding it to ransom. Individuals can have their banking credentials or their identity 
details stolen online and fraudulently used by a criminal, and Australians are falling 
victim to many online frauds, including ‘online romance scams’, with some people 
handing over up to A$100,000 to fake love interests.
1 Phoenixing occurs when a company goes into liquidation, leaving its debts behind, while the assets are shifted to a 
new entity that begins trading again, often under a similar name.
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In late November 2014, the Australian Cybercrime Online Reporting Network (ACORN) 
was launched, allowing members of the public and small to medium businesses to 
report cases of cybercrime. It also provides the public with educational resources 
on how to detect cybercrime and avoid falling victim to increasingly sophisticated 
cybercrime methods. In the first quarter of 2015, more than A$234 million of financial 
loss was reported via the ACORN.2 This figure is based on values nominated by victims 
of cybercrime regarding the loss of data, money, goods and the compromise of personal 
information. Forty-one per cent of loss reported in the first quarter of 2015 resulted 
from online scams or fraud.
How are we responding?
Law enforcement and governments are actively responding to the threats posed by 
organised crime. Collaboration between government agencies, as well as with the 
private sector, is continually strengthening this response through new initiatives and 
improved relationships and information sharing.
The National Organised Crime Response Plan 2015–2018 (the Response Plan) aims to 
enhance current strategies in place as a result of the National Organised Crime Response 
Plan 2010–13, as well as complementing other existing strategies—such as the National 
Plan to Combat Cybercrime and the National Identity Security Strategy—to harden 
Australia’s environment against organised crime.
The Response Plan provides a national platform to progress practical initiatives targeting 
the current key threats, where jurisdictions consider that national action can achieve 
maximum benefit. To meet the evolving and increasingly complex threat posed by 
serious and organised crime, our response requires a coordinated national approach that 
harnesses collective resources, capabilities, expertise and knowledge.
Effectively combating serious and organised crime will be dependent on law 
enforcement’s ability to operate in an increasingly interconnected and globalised 
financial environment, facilitated by the digital economy and international trade. This is a 
challenge faced by all nation states.
New international partnerships and information-sharing initiatives, such as the Five 
Eyes Law Enforcement Group,3 will facilitate targeted international law enforcement 
responses, innovative policy and legislative reform. Australia’s participation in 
international information-exchange forums will help improve our ability to discover, 
understand and respond to transnational serious and organised crime, including 
cybercrime, over the long term.
Ensuring strong border controls is a key factor in limiting the impact of organised crime 
in Australia. The National Border Targeting Centre (NBTC), established in 2013, brings 
together key law enforcement, border security and government policy bodies to develop 
more proactive, informed risk assessment responses to border threats to Australia. The 
NBTC enables increased domestic information sharing and also incorporates intelligence 
from international partner agencies.
2 As these figures are self-reported, their accuracy has not been verified by law enforcement agencies at this time.
3 The Australian Crime Commission and the Australian Federal Police are the Australian representative members of the 
Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group which coordinates intelligence agencies from Australia, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Canada.
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Further, the increasingly complex nature of the serious and organised crime business 
model requires effective partnerships between law enforcement and industry to achieve 
holistic targeting of organised crime activities in Australia. Joint agency task forces 
that target the exploitation of alternative remittance services by organised crime—for 
example, the Eligo National Task Force—work closely with industry participants to 
identify criminal elements exploiting their industry and collaboratively devise strategies 
to help prevent such exploitation.
Preventative partnerships are also crucial. The Australian Cyber Security Centre 
(ACSC) unites cyber security capabilities from across the Australian Government into 
a collaborative hub to share information between member agencies and the private 
and public sectors to combat cyber-security threats. The ACSC also houses CERT 
Australia,4 which deals with large business and government cyber-security incidents. 
Small businesses and the public are able to report incidents through the ACORN, which 
has a convenient online reporting system. The information collected by the ACORN 
and the ACSC (and its integrated assessment agencies) provides the government with 
a contemporary understanding of the changing cyber-security landscape and how to 
harden the environment to protect Australia.
The criminal activities of gangs, particularly outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs), 
consistently attract public attention. The Australian Gangs Intelligence Coordination 
Centre (AGICC) brings together law enforcement, border security and government 
departments with the aim of delivering operational intelligence, strategic intelligence, 
and disruption and prevention strategies. This helps to build a better understanding of 
the gang environment in Australia and inform appropriate response options. The AGICC 
also delivers a dedicated intelligence collection capability for the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP)-led National Anti-Gangs Squad.5
Engagement with the public is crucial to success in combating organised crime; without 
the help of the public in identifying and reporting suspected criminal activity, the 
environment will never be completely hardened against it.
4 CERT Australia is the national Computer Emergency Response Team.
5 The National Anti-Gangs Squad is operational in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia.
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ENABLER ACTIVITIES
The Australian Crime Commission has identified six illicit activities as being ‘key enablers’ 
for organised crime. Those activities are:
  Money laundering
  Cybercrime and technology-enabled crime
  Identity crime
  Criminal exploitation of business structures
  Public sector corruption
  Violence.
These activities are classified as ‘enablers’ because they each have unique roles in 
enabling or facilitating organised crime, but are not an end in themselves—that is, 
money laundering would not be necessary if the crime from which illicit profit had 
been made had not been committed, necessitating concealment of the proceeds of 
that crime. Similarly, the theft of identity documents would pose little threat if those 
documents were not intended to be used to commit offences.
Activities such as money laundering, identity crime, corruption and violence contribute 
to the effectiveness of other types of organised crime. Although not all of the enablers 
are present in every illicit market, enablers can work in unison, with any one organised 
crime group using several enablers at once. Corruption can be used to facilitate, or to 
hide, the use of other enablers.
Importantly, enablers are also unique in that any impacts of law enforcement, regulatory, 
legislative or policy activity that are felt within the enabling activities—such as closing 
loopholes in financial reporting systems to inhibit money laundering—have the potential 
to resonate through all of the illicit markets in which those enabling activities are 
present. For example, should law enforcement capability to identify, trace and prosecute 
cybercrime and technology-enabled crime be enhanced, all of those markets that rely on 
technology to perpetrate crime would be significantly affected.
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Money laundering
Introduction
Money laundering is an intrinsic enabler of serious and organised crime. Organised 
crime groups rely on it as a way of legitimising or hiding the proceeds of their criminal 
activities. Money laundering is carried out at all levels of sophistication by most, if not 
all, organised crime groups.
Money laundering diminishes tax revenue, weakens government control over the 
economy, and can undermine the integrity of Australia’s financial system and other 
industry sectors.6
As a result of concerted law enforcement attention being focused on money laundering 
in Australia, much has recently been learned about the way in which the proceeds 
from the importation and sale of illicit commodities are laundered out of, and within, 
Australia. For example, intelligence arising from the investigations carried out by the 
Eligo National Task Force has revealed that money laundering associated with the 
proceeds of crime derived from illicit commodities markets in Australia is increasingly 
carried out with the assistance of professional advisers and specialist globalised money 
laundering networks (see the case study on page 13).
Current situation
For organised crime operating in Australia, money laundering is increasingly a 
transnational enterprise, with the proceeds of crime generated in Australia typically 
being put through an international money laundering cycle. The complex transnational 
nature of money laundering has led organised crime to more often employ the services 
of professional money laundering syndicates.
Unlike the proceeds from the trafficking and sale of illicit commodities—which are often 
realised in the form of cash—the profits generated by financial crime are likely to be 
already placed7 in a financial system or market, making it easier to electronically transfer 
these funds quickly around the world through a complex series of accounts designed to 
conceal beneficial ownership.
In the case of the proceeds of financial crime, the illicit funds are likely to be ‘washed’ 
by means of a complex series of funds transfers through multiple jurisdictions. These 
transfers are likely to include structured funds transactions, complex business structures 
and Alternative Banking Services.8
6 Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 2011, Money laundering in Australia, AUSTRAC, Sydney.
7 The money laundering cycle typically consists of three stages: placement, layering and integration. Placement occurs 
when illicit funds or assets are introduced into the formal financial system. Layering involves moving, dispersing or 
disguising illegal funds or assets to conceal their true origin. Integration refers to the movement of illicit funds back 
into the legitimate economy.
8 An Alternative Banking Service includes an online banking interface, which sits above and coordinates one or multiple 
bank accounts, supported by company structures, in various international locations.
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CASE STUDY 
ELIGO NATIONAL TASK FORCE
The Eligo National Task Force was established by the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) Board 
in December 2012 to take coordinated collective action against high risk alternative remittance 
and informal value transfer systems1 being used by serious and organised crime to reduce their 
adverse impact on Australia. The Task Force combines the capabilities of the ACC, the Australian 
Federal Police, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, state and territory law 
enforcement and overseas law enforcement partners.
The Eligo National Task Force has yielded significant insights into the way in which the proceeds 
from the trafficking and sale of illicit commodities are laundered, particularly by discovering new 
methods of laundering proceeds of crime. As well as increasing our knowledge of money laundering 
processes, the Task Force has also gained a significant understanding of how alternative remittance 
systems work in different cultures and countries.
The interconnectedness of money laundering networks and the variety of laundering 
methodologies that have been identified demonstrate a truly organised and global system of 
criminal business.
Examples of international money laundering methodologies identified by the Eligo National Task Force 
investigations are informal value transfer systems, trade-based money laundering2 and structuring.
A significant money laundering modus operandi that has been identified in Eligo investigations 
is the use of offshore money laundering superfacilitators. Intelligence has shown that some 
criminal groups using alternative remittance services have their laundering activities coordinated 
by offshore money laundering superfacilitators or controllers, who direct the activities of ‘cash 
collectors’ in multiple countries, including Australia. These cash collectors are used to place 
money into the alternative remittance system, where offshore superfacilitators will manage the 
money laundering process (see Figure 1).
Since its commencement, the Eligo National Task Force has undertaken significant operational 
activity, culminating in the disruption of several global money laundering and drug networks.  
In conjunction with partner agencies, Task Force investigations to date3 have resulted in: 
  A$65.9 million in cash seized
  A$925.7 million in estimated street value of drugs and precursors seized
  289 persons arrested on 673 charges
  A$46 million in assets restrained
  52 serious and organised criminal networks or groups disrupted
  284 new targets identified that were previously unknown to law enforcement.
Prevention is also a focus of the Task Force, which will aim to harden the alternative remittance 
services sector against exploitation by organised crime. The Task Force is working with industry to 
identify areas of vulnerability and drive initiatives aimed at preventing further such exploitation. 
1 Informal value transfer systems are global networks for financial transactions that involve transferring the value of 
currency without necessarily physically relocating it.  For further information, please refer to the ACC website: https://
www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/IVTS%20D6.pdf 
2 Trade-based money laundering allows organised crime groups to move funds by disguising it as legitimate trade. 
For further information, please refer to the ACC website: https://www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/
Trade%20Based%20D5.pdf
3 As at 31 March 2015.
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Money Laundering:
 
The basic motivation behind most crime is to make money. If 
criminals want to use that money it needs to appear to have 
come from legitimate sources. This means they need to ‘clean’ 
or ‘launder’ it. There is no single method of laundering money. 
Money launderers have shown themselves to be imaginative, 
and utilise a variety of methods to get around counter-measures 
designed to identify and stop this activity.
Figure 1: A money laundering methodology identified in Eligo National Task Force investigations
Current situation (continued)
The Eligo National Task Force has identified the increasing use of professional money 
laundering syndicates by serious and organised crime groups, primarily those involved 
in trafficking illicit drugs. However, those involved in serious and organised financial 
crime probably possess, or have access to, sufficient expertise to support laundering the 
proceeds of their crimes independently of professional money laundering syndicates.
Globalisation and technology have led to the development of a financial system that 
permits the rapid transfer of value around the world, with those responsible for the 
movement of the funds able to orchestrate transfers with relative anonymity from 
behind a computer screen.
Money laundering is carried out through a diverse range of financial markets and by a 
variety of methods. Some examples of how organised crime can exploit financial markets 
and/or methodologies to launder the proceeds of crime are:
  The securities or share market is attractive for money laundering as it offers a diverse 
and complex suite of investment vehicles across domestic and international markets. 
The securities market can afford investors a high level of anonymity, particularly 
when trading through professional brokers. The reporting of suspicious financial 
transactions in the securities market remains relatively low.
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  Foreign exchange trading—or ‘forex’ trading—involves the swapping or trading 
of one currency for another, with a profit or loss being made when one currency 
increases or decreases in value. Foreign exchange trading is likely to be attractive to 
those engaged in money laundering as such markets are highly liquid and operate 
internationally, enabling high levels of anonymity.
  Virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin, continue to be used as a means of transferring 
value online and without reliance on any financial institutions to facilitate the 
transaction.
  Complex offshore and third-party business structures are used to disguise wealth and 
inhibit law enforcement and regulatory bodies in the collection of evidence of illicit 
activities.
  Professional facilitators perform a key role in money laundering associated with 
sophisticated financial crime. Serious and organised crime entities often require the 
services of a range of professionals to advise on, establish and, in some instances, 
administer complex financial and corporate structures that have been set up to 
launder proceeds of crime.
  Investment in high-value commodities—such as real estate, precious stones, art, 
antiques and gold—can be used by organised crime entities to place and integrate 
illicit funds into the legitimate economy. For example, organised crime can invest 
in Australia’s real-estate sector, with the investments subsequently sold and the 
proceeds from the sale integrated into the formal banking system.
Serious and organised crime groups are increasingly employing financial technology 
platforms to advance their criminal activities. These Alternative Banking Services may 
be used for large-scale frauds and avoidance of taxation obligations. They require a high 
degree of financial acumen to establish and manage, in order to successfully disguise 
funds transfers outside the regulated environment. The ability of those involved in serious 
and organised crime to launder money allows for re-investment of the proceeds of crime, 
and therefore the perpetuation of criminal enterprise. Money laundering activities also 
have the potential to cause reputational damage to financial institutions or, in more 
severe scenarios, to undermine the soundness and stability of financial institutions and 
systems, discourage foreign investment, distort international capital flows and damage 
diplomatic relations. A government’s inability to inhibit the laundering of illicit funds may 
lead to a perception that it is legislatively or administratively ineffectual. Such reputational 
damage can discourage investment, as corporations and foreign governments seek to 
distance themselves from nation states ‘tainted’ by money laundering.
Further harm may be caused by the methods that are used to launder money. The 
primary goal of money laundering is to give illicit money the appearance of legitimacy. 
Consequently, funds are likely to be invested not on the basis of likely returns, but in 
businesses or schemes that provide the greatest chance of concealing the origins of the 
money. This can erode the ‘level playing field’ on which legitimate businesses compete, 
distort markets and enhance the economic power of organised crime.
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Cybercrime and technology-enabled crime
Introduction
The threat to Australia from cybercrime and technology-enabled crime perpetrated by 
international and domestic organised crime groups is significant. Technology, computers 
and the Internet are now integral parts of everyday life, used for purposes such as 
Internet banking, online shopping, email and communication through social media. 
Organised crime has identified and seized the opportunity to exploit for financial gain 
Australians’ use of digital systems and the Internet. There are a diverse range of devices 
that can be exploited by criminal actors, including computers, mobile phones and point 
of sale (POS) systems. Potential victims include government, critical infrastructure 
agencies, industry, businesses and the public.
The 2013 Norton Report estimates that cybercrime affected five million Australians 
in the previous 12 months and cost Australians A$1.06 billion.9 This is likely to be 
an underestimation, as it is only based on adult individuals affected and does not 
consider the cost to industry and government. It has been reported that the most costly 
cybercrimes affecting Australian companies are those caused by malware, distributed 
denial of service and malicious insiders.10 As mentioned in the introductory chapter of 
this document, more than A$234 million worth of financial loss was self-reported by 
victims of cybercrime to the Australian Cybercrime Online Reporting Network (ACORN) 
in the first quarter of 2015.11 If similar figures continue to be reported each period, this 
would equate to A$936 million over one year. It is important to note that this estimate 
would only account for losses affecting members of the public and small to medium 
businesses.
Current situation
In Australia, cybercrime and technology-enabled crime refers to criminal acts involving 
the use of computers or other information and communications technology (ICT), or 
targeted against computers or other ICT. The term ‘cybercrime and technology-enabled 
crime’ is defined as:
  Crimes directed at computing or other ICT, such as unauthorised access to, 
modification of or impairment of electronic communications or data. The 
international community refers to this as pure cybercrime.
  Crimes in which computers or ICT are an integral part of the offence, such as online 
fraud, online identity theft and the online distribution of child exploitation material. 
The international community refers to this as facilitated cybercrime.
9 Symantec 2013, ‘2013 Norton Report: Total cost of cybercrime in Australia amounts to AU$1.06 billion’, media 
release, 13 October 2013, viewed 19 January 2015, <http://www.symantec.com/en/au/about/news/release/article.
jsp?prid=20131015_01>.
10 Ponemon Institute 2013, 2013 Cost of Cyber Crime Study: Australia, Ponemon Institute, Traverse City, Michigan, 
October 2013.
11 As these figures are self-reported, their accuracy has not been verified by law enforcement agencies at this time.
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Australia has a large and increasing number of Internet users, all of whom are potential 
victims of cybercrime. At the end of June 2014, in Australia there were more than 
12.4 million Internet subscribers and almost 20.6 million subscribers to mobile services 
with an Internet connection.12 Mobile devices are just as vulnerable to attack as 
traditional devices such as desktop computers and laptops; however, many mobile users 
do not give the same degree of consideration to the security of these devices as they do 
to computers. The 2013 Norton Report revealed that 57 per cent of Australian mobile 
device users were not aware of security options for mobile devices, leaving their devices 
susceptible to attack.13
Cybercrime committed against Australians is assessed to be largely carried out by 
individuals and organised crime groups based offshore. However, increasing awareness 
of, and access to, online criminal forums and marketplaces (often referred to as 
‘darknets’) is also enabling Australia-based criminal actors to share information and to 
trade illicit services and commodities internationally. Cybercrime toolsets, predominantly 
malicious software (‘malware’), are available for purchase and ongoing service support is 
provided. This widens access to a previously highly technical capability to any actor with 
an average proficiency and a criminal intent to pursue an illicit profit.
Some malware can operate without detection by anti-virus software. Malware is 
sophisticated, intelligent, versatile and available, and is affecting a broader range of 
targets and devices.14 The development of malware is maintaining pace with the modern 
technological environment, constantly evolving to counter new security mechanisms 
so that it maintains effectiveness. ZeroAccess is an example of a recent strain of highly 
resilient malware that has compromised a large number of Australian devices and 
continues as a persistent threat (see the case study on page 18).
Organised Crime in Australia 2013 reported on an increase in ‘ransomware’ campaigns 
against computers in Australia and around the world. There are variations on the 
ransomware campaign methodologies and themes. Some ransomware encrypts all 
files and will not allow access until a fee has been paid to decrypt them. Other types 
of ransomware disable user input, indicate that files have been encrypted and activate 
the webcam in an effort to convince the user that their system is under real-time 
surveillance. This is reinforced by an accompanying message (often purporting to be 
from a law enforcement or government agency) claiming that the computer had been 
used in illegal activity and demanding payment of a ‘fine’. These types of cybercrime 
campaigns have increasingly affected Australian systems over the last two years (see the 
case study on page 19).
12 Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013, Internet activity Australia, June 2014, Cat. no. 8153.0, ABS, Canberra, viewed 3 
October 2014, <http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/8153.0/>.
13 Symantec 2013, ‘2013 Norton Report: Total cost of cybercrime in Australia amounts to AU$1.06 billion’, media 
release, 13 October 2013, viewed 19 January 2015, <http://www.symantec.com/en/au/about/news/release/article.
jsp?prid=20131015_01>.
14 Europol European Cybercrime Centre EC3 2014, The Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (iOCTA) 2014, 
viewed 27 November 2014, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/iocta/2014/>.
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CASE STUDY 
ZEROACCESS
Between October and December 2014, ‘ZeroAccess’ malware reportedly compromised an 
average of 4,000 Australian devices per day.1 The ZeroAccess botnet2 is a large collection of 
infected computers linked by peer-to-peer infrastructure3 being directed to carry out bitcoin 
mining4 and click fraud5 on victims’ computers.
ZeroAccess is highly commercialised and highly profitable malware with a ‘pay-per-install’ 
incentive that has contributed to its growth. The amount paid is based on the country in 
which the installation occurs, with installations on Australian computers earning US$75.6
ZeroAccess uses an advanced method of self-protection by disabling any security tool trying 
to detect and remove it.7 It also targets a diverse range of devices. It affected POS systems 
in 60 Pizza Hut stores in Australia over a 12-month period in 2014. Trade was halted for up 
to two hours per incident and, in some cases, stores were offline for an entire day because 
infected machines required re-imaging.8
Despite overseas law enforcement interdiction, ZeroAccess has proved resilient. In December 
2013, Europol, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Microsoft worked together to disrupt 
the ZeroAccess botnet but reported that they were unable to completely disrupt it because 
of its complexity.9
ZeroAccess remains a high threat in Australia, being one of the malware types most 
commonly reported by Australian victims.10 Although its current functions are bitcoin mining 
and click fraud, it has the potential to be used for other types of cybercrime activity.
1 Australian Communications and Media Authority, AISI malware statistics, viewed 19 December 2014, <http://www.
acma.gov.au/Industry/Internet/e-Security/Australian-Internet-Security-Initiative/aisi-malware-statistics-1>.
2 A botnet is a large network of infected computers owned by individuals who are unaware that their computers are 
compromised. Botnets are controlled remotely by a command control (C2) server.
3 Peer-to-peer infrastructure is a network of computers, usually connected through the Internet, that enables 
propagation of communications among the peers, without the need for a central server.
4 Bitcoin mining is a legitimate activity and is integral to the bitcoin system. As bitcoin is not centrally controlled, mining 
is the process by which transactions are validated in the bitcoin blockchain. It involves using a computer to solve 
complex cryptographic algorithms that, when solved, close off a block in the chain, thus protecting it from being 
changed and reinforcing the legitimacy of transactions. When a ‘miner’ solves a problem, they are rewarded with 
bitcoin.
5 Click fraud abuses pay-per-click advertising to make money through fraudulent clicks. Pay-per-click advertising is a 
major industry, generating billions of dollars per year. A hosting website places an advertiser’s ad on their website and 
each time the ad is clicked the advertiser pays the hosting website. A cybercrime actor can make money if they can 
generate fraudulent clicks on an advertisement and are also the hosting website that receives payment.
6 Wyke, J 2012, Sophos Technical Paper: The ZeroAccess botnet—mining and fraud for massive financial gain, Sophos, 
September 2012, viewed 19 December 2014, <http://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical%20
papers/Sophos_ZeroAccess_Botnet.pdf>.
7 McAfee for Business, Threat Intelligence: ZeroAccess.a, viewed 27 November 2014, <http://www.mcafee.com/threat-
intelligence/malware/default.aspx?id=562354>.
8 Vijay 2014, ‘Pizza Hut Australia point of sales hit with ZeroAccess rootkit malware for over a year’, Tech Worm, 10 
November 2014, viewed 19 December 2014, <http://www.techworm.net/2014/11/pizza-hut-australia-point-sales-hit-
zeroaccess-rootkit-malware-year.html>.
9 Kirk, J 2013, ‘ZeroAccess click-fraud botnet disrupted, but not dead yet’, Computer Security Online, 6 December 2013, 
viewed 19 December 2014, http://www.cso.com.au/article/533664/_zeroaccess_click-fraud_botnet_disrupted_dead_
yet/; Europol 2013, ‘Notorious botnet infecting 2 million computers disrupted’, media release, 5 December 2013, 
viewed 19 January 2015, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/notorious-botnet-infecting-2-million-computers-
disrupted-0>.
10 Australian Communications and Media Authority, AISI malware statistics, available at <http://www.acma.gov.au/
Industry/Internet/e-Security/Australian-Internet-Security-Initiative/aisi-malware-statistics-1>.
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CASE STUDY 
TORRENTLOCKER
First identified as a new variant of malware in February 2014, TorrentLocker is designed 
to avoid known virtual malware testing environments and to employ novel techniques 
to ensure that detection and evaluation are difficult.1 Once initiated, certified encryption 
protocols protect the malware files on the victim’s computer.2
During 2014, TorrentLocker was distributed by means of spam emails targeting  
13 countries but, as identified by the Australian Crime Commission (ACC), initially it 
only targeted Australia. The ransom message delivered to Australian computers listed 
the ransom fee in Australian dollars and required the victim to purchase bitcoins from 
specified Australian bitcoin websites and send the payment to the bitcoin address 
provided.3
As at December 2014, it was estimated that TorrentLocker had infected more than 
39,000 systems worldwide and that 570 of them (less than 2 per cent) had paid the 
ransom.4 It is estimated that the total ransom money paid to that date was worth 
between US$292,700 and US$585,401.5
TorrentLocker used the branding of a number of trusted and well-recognised Australian 
corporations. The misappropriation of business names and the counterfeiting of 
legitimate brands harm the reputation of these businesses, may destroy the loyalty of 
established customers and will cost businesses financially if they seek remediation. The 
onus is then on the affected business to expend time and resources in educating its 
customer base about scams that exploit its business identity. One prominent Australian 
corporate victim whose brand has been exploited by the ransomware infection campaign 
estimates that since mid-2014 its response to TorrentLocker has cost A$185,000. This 
response has included monitoring, takedown actions against malicious domains, and 
brand protection.
The ACC’s detailed understanding of the TorrentLocker malware resulted in the ACC 
proving that other allied countries were also being targeted by TorrentLocker, albeit not 
to the same extent as Australia.
1 Léveillé, MM 2014, ‘TorrentLocker ransomware in a country near you’, welivesecurity, December 2014, viewed 11 
February 2015, <www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/torrent_locker.pdf>.
2 ibid. 
3 Hummel, R 2014, ‘Analysis of “TorrentLocker”—a new strain of ransomware using components of CryptoLocker and 
CryptoWall’, iSIGHT Partners, 15 August 2014, viewed 11 February 2015, <http://www.isightpartners.com/2014/08/
analysis-torrentlocker-new-strain-malware-using-components-cryptolocker-cryptowall/>.
4 Léveillé, MM 2014, ‘TorrentLocker ransomware in a country near you’, welivesecurity, December 2014, viewed 11 
February 2015, <www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/torrent_locker.pdf>.
5 ibid. 
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The Internet is an integral part of our everyday lives, with our reliance on it continuing 
to grow. The automation of industry, government departments, businesses and banking 
presents risks from cybercrime at a systemic and individual level. The Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner reports that the potential for personal information 
to be misused, lost or inappropriately accessed, modified and disclosed is increased 
by greater collection of personal information in the online environment and reliance 
on electronic and online records.15 Both businesses and government have a business 
requirement to collect and store customer information. However, this information is 
appealing to criminals and is at risk of exploitation for criminal deployment of malware, 
hacking and malicious insider exploitation. For example, in December 2014, an Australian 
hacker broke into an online travel insurance provider’s systems, stealing the personal 
details of about 770,000 customers.
Cybercrime motivated by political or other issues (colloquially known as ‘hacktivism’) 
continues to be detected around the world. In late 2014 and early 2015 there were a 
number of high-profile instances of issue-motivated cybercrime. These included the 
cybercrime acts against Sony Pictures, resulting in the release of employee personal 
information, emails and unreleased films, and cybercrime acts against the United States 
Central Command’s Twitter feed.
Identity crime
Introduction
Identity crime is a generic term that describes activities or offences in which a 
perpetrator steals a person’s identity or uses a fabricated, manipulated, stolen or 
otherwise assumed identity to facilitate the commission of a crime.16
Identity crime, though under-reported, is among the most prevalent crime types. An 
increased reliance on personal identity information (PII) in online services, along with the 
exploitation of technology by criminals, has seen identity crime become one of the most 
pervasive crime types in Australia.
Identity crime acts as an enabler of a wide range of other organised criminal activities, 
particularly the facilitation of financial crimes and money laundering, which can result in 
significant harm to individuals, business, the government and the economy.
15 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 2015, Guide to securing personal information, January 2015, viewed 
22 January 2015, <http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-guides/guide-to-information-security>.
16 Adapted from Australasian Centre for Policing Research 2006, Standardisation of definitions of identity crime terms: a 
step towards consistency, viewed 5 November 2013, <http://www.anzpaa.org.au/anzpire/acprpublications>.
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Current situation
A community survey conducted by the Australian Institute of Criminology in 201317 
found that 9.4 per cent of respondents reported having their personal information stolen 
or misused in the previous 12 months. Five per cent of respondents (equivalent to about 
1 million people throughout Australia) reported that they suffered financial losses as a 
result. This rate of victimisation is higher than for most other types of personal and theft-
related crimes.
A report published by the Attorney-General’s Department in 2014 estimated that the 
total economic impact of identity crime on Australia was at least A$1.6 billion per year.18 
The United Kingdom’s Fraud Prevention Service (known as CIFAS) has found that 49 per 
cent of all fraud was identity fraud and that over 60 per cent of all fraud involved some 
form of identity-related crime.19
However, accurate measurement of the full extent of identity crime offences, their 
impact and the extent to which serious and organised crime groups are involved is 
limited by a number of factors:
  The cross-jurisdictional nature of identity crime creates difficulties in determining 
which jurisdiction an offence has been committed in. For example, PII could be 
stolen in one country and used to commit an offence in another. The difficulties are 
exacerbated by the increasing use of cloud computer storage, allowing businesses 
to outsource their information technology services and applications to a third party, 
which may be located interstate or offshore.
  Identity crime–related legislation and its application vary across police jurisdictions. 
Identity-related crimes are often recorded and/or prosecuted using other types of 
offences such as fraud, particularly where these other offences attract higher penalties.
  Identity crime–related incidents are not always reported. Victims may not be aware 
that their PII has been compromised, or may report the offence to their financial 
institution rather than the police.
  At a corporate level, businesses may be reluctant to report losses from identity crime 
to avoid a loss of confidence in the business.
  The impact of PII theft may not be evident for a number of years, as PII may be stored 
for future use. Consequently, law enforcement agencies may have trouble identifying 
the original source and the time of the breach.
  Identity crime as an enabler provides key support to much broader criminal activities, 
such as money laundering and drug trafficking, meaning that the harm resulting from 
the identity-related crime component is difficult to measure.
17 Smith, RG & Hutchings, A 2014, Identity crime and misuse in Australia: results of the 2013 online survey, Australian 
Institute of Criminology Reports, Research and Public Policy Series no. 128, AIC, Canberra.
18 Attorney-General’s Department 2014, Identity crime and misuse in Australia: key findings from the National Identity 
Crime and Misuse Measurement Framework Pilot, AGD, Canberra.
19 CIFAS 2014, Fraudscape: depicting the UK’s fraud landscape, March 2014, viewed 20 February 2015, <https://www.
cifas.org.uk/research_and_reports>.
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Stolen or false identities can be used by criminals to perpetrate frauds and to establish 
business structures and companies through which to facilitate crimes such as money 
laundering. Identity crime has also been used to commit welfare, tax and other fraud 
against government agencies, to gain unauthorised access to sensitive information or 
facilities, to conceal other criminal activities such as drug trafficking and procuring child 
exploitation material, and even to facilitate the commission of terrorist acts.
Fraudulent identity credentials can be obtained for amounts ranging from about A$80 
for Medicare cards, A$350 for drivers licences, A$1,500 for a genuine Australian passport 
altered by a professional document forger, to as much as A$20,000-$30,000 for a 
legitimately issued passport with fraudulent identity details.20
These types of primary and secondary identity documents can then be used to support 
criminal activities such as credit card fraud, bank fraud and money laundering (see the 
case study on page 23).
Organised crime continues to adapt its identity crime methodologies to exploit 
technological changes. The use of wireless technology for credit card payments, or 
‘tap and go’, is enabling the reading of PII on various kinds of identity and credit cards. 
An industry survey found that over half of Australian adults use public or unsecured 
Wi-Fi, with a quarter of these people using it to shop online (27 per cent) or to access 
their bank accounts (25 per cent).21 As well, smartphones and related devices that send 
emails and access online social networking sites provide organised crime with a single, 
and often unsecured, avenue through which to target the PII of individuals. Those using 
poor security practices—such as providing personal information to unknown sources 
and using devices without adequate anti-virus software—are most likely to fall victim to 
these identity crime methodologies.
There is also a risk that organised crime may seek to corrupt or compromise individuals 
employed in sectors with access to large datasets of PII. Through these individuals, 
organised crime may be able to access PII for use in other criminal activities.22
Use of the Document Verification Service (DVS) by government agencies and private 
sector organisations is increasing and over time this could be expected to help reduce 
the use of fake or stolen identity documents in the community. The DVS enables 
organisations to verify information they are presented on identity documents against the 
records of the document issuing agency, in real time through a secure online system.
It is important that service delivery agencies undertake robust security and fraud risk 
assessments, in consultation with law enforcement and other relevant agencies, to help 
ensure that these risks can be managed effectively.
20 Attorney-General’s Department 2014, Identity crime and misuse in Australia: key findings from the National Identity 
Crime and Misuse Measurement Framework Pilot, AGD, Canberra.
21 Symantec 2013, 2013 Norton Report—country report: Australia, viewed 2 February 2015, <http://www.symantec.
com/content/en/us/about/presskits/b-norton-report-2013-australia.pdf>.
22 Attorney-General’s Department 2014, Identity crime and misuse in Australia: key findings from the National Identity 
Crime and Misuse Measurement Framework Pilot, AGD, Canberra.
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Although most identity crime against individuals involves relatively small financial losses, 
in some cases these losses can be very significant. Also, being a victim of identity crime 
can also involve significant non-financial impacts, including reputational damage as well 
as emotional and psychological harm.
Criminal exploitation of business structures
Introduction
The criminal exploitation of business structures involves both the use of unlawful business 
practices and the deliberate structuring of businesses for purposes including the following:
  to conceal the criminal infiltration of an industry
  to generate and/or conceal illicit profits
  to gain an unfair advantage over competitors by expanding market share.
CASE STUDY 
SYDNEY-BASED IDENTITY FRAUD GROUP
In February 2015, a joint agency investigation codenamed Operation Mera,1 based in 
New South Wales (NSW), arrested four people in relation to their alleged involvement in 
a fraudulent identification manufacturing operation.
The group’s alleged activities were reported to have been first identified when the 
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service found 5,000 NSW drivers licence 
holograms concealed in a package imported from China.
Search warrants executed at a number of locations have reportedly seized ‘computer 
equipment, printers, card cutters, thousands of blank cards, holograms for licences and 
credit cards, electronic card templates, card readers, and fraudulent identity documents 
in various states of manufacture from both Australia and overseas’. As well, more than 
100 mobile phones, cash and false identity documents were also allegedly located.
1 New South Wales Police Force 2015, ‘Joint agency investigation shuts down fraudulent identity manufacturing 
operation’, media release, 26 February 2015, viewed 26 February 2015, <http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/news/latest_
releases?sq_content_src=%2BdXJsPWh0dHBzJTNBJTJGJTJGZWJpenByZC5wb2xpY2UubnN3Lmdvdi5hdSUyRm1lZGlhJTJ
GNDQ1OTEuaHRtbCZhbGw9MQ%3D%3D>.
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This may be through the exploitation of simple and complex business structures, through 
the practice of fraudulent phoenixing,23 and increasingly with the support of professional 
facilitators who have the expertise to navigate through complicated business practices 
and arrangements in order to conceal illegal activities and avoid detection.
The criminal exploitation of business structures by organised crime results in financial 
gains for criminals and financial losses to the Australian economy. It may also affect 
public confidence and the perceived legitimacy and validity of business and company 
regulatory processes and requirements.
Current situation
Simple business structures
The simplest form of business structure—the sole trader—makes up the highest 
proportion of registered businesses in Australia. This type of structure is predominantly 
used to operate businesses in cash-intensive industries, and these industries are 
attractive to organised crime because of the relatively untraceable nature of cash 
transactions and the opportunity to commingle illicit and legitimate funds. Organised 
crime groups can create multiple sole trader entities in order to facilitate tax evasion or 
money laundering activities.
Organised crime can also exploit business and company registration processes through 
the use of identity crime, fictitious names or the placement of ‘straw’ or nominee 
proprietors or company office holders. Law enforcement investigations have typically 
shown organised crime involved in operating ‘cash’ businesses.
Complex business structures
There is continued use of complex ownership and control structures, often involving 
separate entities from multiple jurisdictions, to effectively hide the ultimate beneficial 
ownership of the underlying entity and any asset holdings. Complex business structures, 
particularly trusts with international connections, are mainly used to commit large-scale 
revenue and taxation fraud and facilitate money laundering. Complex business structures 
are exploited by organised crime to facilitate circumvention of Anti-Money Laundering 
and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 reporting requirements, to establish complex 
business structures that create opacity of wealth, to set up offshore structures used to 
channel funds from Australia, or to hide wealth for the purposes of evading taxation.
Project Wickenby24 investigations uncovered the abuse of complex legal structures 
involving chains of company ownership, trusts and other corporate entities to hide the 
true ownership of funds for tax evasion purposes.
23 Phoenixing occurs when a company goes into liquidation, leaving its debts behind, while the assets are shifted to a 
new entity that begins trading again, often under a similar name.
24 Project Wickenby is a cross-agency task force designed to strengthen national law enforcement and Australian 
Taxation Office (ATO) compliance activities against taxation fraud. Led by the ATO, Project Wickenby includes the 
Australian Crime Commission, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 
the Attorney-General’s Department, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, the Australian 
Government Solicitor and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.
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Also, transnational ‘cold-calling’ investment fraud activity25 is facilitated by the ease with 
which organised crime is able to develop sophisticated offshore business structures that 
effectively protect and insulate against law enforcement and regulatory identification 
and oversight.
Fraudulent ‘phoenix’ activity
Fraudulent ‘phoenix’ activity occurs when a company goes into liquidation, leaving its 
debts behind, while the assets are shifted to a new entity that begins trading again, often 
under a similar name. This deliberate practice is used to avoid paying the company’s 
creditors and its taxation liabilities to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). The Fair Work 
Ombudsman released a research report in 2012, prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
and titled Phoenix activity: sizing the problem and matching solutions,26 which estimated 
that the annual cost of fraudulent phoenix activity in Australia is between A$1.78 billion 
and A$3.19 billion. This figure represents a combination of unpaid wages and other 
employee entitlements, losses to businesses in the form of unpaid debts and non-
provision of services, and loss of government revenues.
Intelligence shows that fraudulent phoenix activity typically occurs in the small business 
sector (companies with fewer than 20 employees). Those industries in which phoenixing 
most commonly occurs include labour hire, cleaning, security, building and construction 
(particularly property development), manufacturing and retail (see the case study on 
page 26). A common methodology used to facilitate this activity is to register companies 
using non-existent directors or third-party/nominee directors.
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) reports that, during the 
financial year 2013–14, the company directors of 1,400 companies and 2,500 individuals 
in the building and construction, labour hire, transport, security and cleaning industries 
were targeted because of their history of failed companies.27 During the 2012–13 
financial year, ASIC reported that the construction industry had the largest number of 
company failures, with 2,245—or 24 per cent—of total failures. This was an increase of 
2 per cent over the previous year. Possible misconduct existed in more than two-thirds of 
all failures in that reporting period.28
The expanded director penalty regime now makes directors personally liable for 
their company’s outstanding pay-as-you-go (PAYG) withholding and superannuation 
guarantee. This reduces the scope for companies to escape paying employee 
entitlements for associated liquidated companies, but does not make them liable for 
other outstanding debts.
25 Also known as ‘boiler-room’ fraud, cold-calling investment fraud refers to the unsolicited contacting of potential 
investors who are deliberately given fraudulent, false, misleading or deceptive information designed to entice them 
to buy, sell or retain securities or other investments. This fraud attracts victims with promises of high financial returns 
and claims of low risk investment strategies.
26 PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012, Phoenix activity: sizing the problem and matching solutions, Fair Work Ombudsman, 
Canberra, June 2012.
27 Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2014, Annual Report 2013–2014, ASIC, Sydney.
28 Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2013, Report 372: Insolvency statistics: external administrators’ 
reports (July 2012 to June 2013), ASIC, Sydney, October 2013, p. 6.
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The ATO has noted an increase in phoenixing activity to facilitate tax evasion, and law 
enforcement has seen increasing evidence of organised crime involvement in the type of 
industries susceptible to phoenixing.
Fraudulent use of trust structures
Despite trusts playing a legitimate role in the protection of assets and estate planning, 
the exploitation of trust structures, particularly those established in offshore tax havens, 
has been identified (see the case study on page 27). The exploitation of trust structures 
is used to conceal the ultimate beneficial ownership of underlying assets, and for large-
scale revenue and taxation fraud activities.
Most of the 700,000 trusts now registered in the Australian tax system are discretionary 
trusts used for a wide variety of legitimate business and investment activities. However, 
in relation to phoenixing, the ATO has noted an emerging scheme that involves 
interposing shell companies as trust beneficiaries and then liquidating these companies 
before trust tax debts are paid.
As trust structures are more expensive and potentially complicated to establish, and 
have more complex administration and taxation aspects than other types of business 
structures, there is an enhanced requirement to use professional facilitators.
CASE STUDY 
FRAUDULENT PHOENIXING ACTIVITY
An earthmoving, garden supplies and property development business based in Perth 
created fake payment summaries, moved employees between related companies, and failed 
to remit monies withheld from employees’ wages to the ATO. The business owner then 
deregistered the (non-compliant) companies to reduce the risk of detection by authorities.
The principal company director was sentenced to five years and three months jail for 
defrauding the Commonwealth of A$6.7 million in unremitted taxes. He was also bankrupted 
after an investigation into his personal tax affairs. A number of other people associated with 
this fraud have also been prosecuted and jailed, including a former tax agent.1
1 Australian Taxation Office, The fight against tax crime: fraudulent phoenix activities, ATO, viewed 15 January 2015, 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/General/The-fight-against-tax-crime/Our-focus/Fraudulent--phoenix--activities/>.
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Professional facilitators
The use of professional facilitators remains a key aspect of the exploitation of business 
structures by organised crime. Because of the ever-increasing complexity of regulation 
surrounding financial markets and products, the use of a variety of specialists—some 
of whom are complicit, and some of whom are unwittingly providing assistance—is 
required to help criminal groups operate their legitimate and illicit businesses (see the 
case study on page 28).
The level of professional facilitator involvement can range from concealing illicit funds 
in a lawyer’s trust account, to the use of a network of complicit advisers and specialists 
establishing complex business structures in numerous offshore jurisdictions.
Although law enforcement and regulators continue to find evidence of the use of 
both simple and complex business structures and illegal business practices to facilitate 
criminal activity and to hide the proceeds of crime, the full nature and extent of 
organised crime involvement remain an intelligence gap.
Organised crime entities can purchase businesses in particular sectors in order to achieve 
a market share large enough to enable them to manipulate the prices of certain goods 
and services. This can undermine competitive neutrality, because such entities may have 
an unfair competitive advantage within industries, which can cause harm to legitimate 
businesses and to the economy.
CASE STUDY 
ABUSIVE USE OF TRUST ACTIVITIES
The abusive use of trusts was employed to avoid in excess of A$50 million in tax in the 
property development sector over a period of 10 years. It involved the siphoning off of 
profits from the main entities to trusts and companies controlled by the principal and 
their siblings, with these profits then remitted offshore.
In some cases, completed properties were transferred below market value to related trusts, 
before being re-valued to market and fully mortgaged, with the finance raised purportedly 
committed to a sham offshore property development syndicate. These funds were 
subsequently represented as having been lost. This had the effect of understating assessable 
profits, creating insolvency and recovery difficulties, and transferring wealth offshore 
without tax being paid. The case also involved related straw directors (including offshore 
nominee directors), and raised doubts about the independence of appointed liquidators.
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Public sector corruption
Introduction
Public sector corruption can be a powerful enabler for organised crime and, as a 
consequence, organised crime entities continue to target public sector officials who can 
help them facilitate their criminal enterprises. Although those public officials who can 
provide immediate assistance to serious and organised crime are targeted specifically, 
those who may be of use in the future are also targeted more generally.
As noted by Transparency International:
The relationship between organised crime and corruption is a simple one—criminal 
networks make extensive use of corruption, in its various forms, to carry out criminal 
activity, avoid investigation and escape prosecution. Conversely, corruption within society 
propagates and becomes much more entrenched when routinely instrumentalised by 
organised crime. A type of continuum exists, ranging from co-option of junior level 
officials, that is, effectively placing them on the crime group’s payroll, through infiltration 
of managerial, senior spheres, to influencing heads of law enforcement agencies and 
finally ending in the capture of state policies and structures.29
29 Muravska, J, Hughes, W & Pyman, M 2011, Organised crime, corruption, and the vulnerability of defence and security 
forces, Background Paper, Transparency International, London, p. 5.
CASE STUDY 
USE OF BROKERS AND GEOLOGISTS IN 
INVESTMENT FRAUD
A syndicate identified by the Australian Crime Commission had established a number of 
‘start-up’ companies in the mining and resources sector and had also used coercion to 
take control of existing companies.
Once the syndicate members had acquired control of significant shareholdings, they 
undertook aggressive capital-raising and marketing campaigns.
As part of their marketing campaigns, the syndicate employed geologists and company 
research firms to inflate the potential of mining tenements and exploration projects 
and release favourable research results with ‘buy’ recommendations to investors. As 
the share price inflated, a global network of brokers was employed to sell syndicate 
members’ shareholdings.
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In particular, the large profits available in Australia’s illicit drug markets are a strong 
motivator for organised crime groups to develop the capability to corrupt in order to 
facilitate access to those markets. As well, corrupt officials may also assist in the money 
laundering process—for instance, by providing false identification documents or visas.
As intelligence-driven law enforcement agency and border protection activities become 
more effective, there is a greater incentive for organised crime to corrupt government 
officers to gain knowledge and capability to evade them.30 Organised crime would regard 
corruption of a public official as a ‘business cost’.31 Accordingly, a focus for Commonwealth 
law enforcement agencies is to counter potential growth in corruption-enabled border 
crime, including collusion between officers in different agencies or layers of government.
Corruption can undermine the fundamental trust of the public in government, and in the 
legitimacy of the instruments of government. Corruption can work insidiously to protect 
the business of serious and organised crime, and to prevent the identification of criminal 
behaviour.
Current situation
Australia is perceived as a relatively corruption-free country. Recent declines in 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranking for Australia—from 
the seventh least corrupt country in 2012, to the ninth least corrupt country in 2013, 
and currently to the eleventh least corrupt in 201432—perhaps may result from efforts 
in Australia to deal with major corruption incidents transparently, as much as they may 
appear to show a deterioration of public sector standards. Australia’s overall ranking 
remains very high and is comparable with the rankings of countries such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Canada.
Australian anti-corruption bodies inform the public’s understanding of public sector 
corruption through investigations and generate important intelligence and insights about 
corruption risks and systems vulnerabilities. However, anti-corruption agencies have 
noted a concern that, as the sophistication of organised crime increases, corrupt conduct 
is likely to become less susceptible to discovery than was previously the case.33
Two separate streams of vulnerability to corruption by organised crime are becoming 
apparent to law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies in Australia. The first is the 
historically identified risk of the corruption of public sector officials whose seniority or role/
function puts them in a position in which they can facilitate or protect criminal activities. 
In some instances, organised crime groups may be more likely to target vulnerable 
persons in lower levels in the public sector, where their positions offer access to privileged 
information that could assist organised crime activities. The second is an emerging 
generational risk posed by younger new recruits. Though the first of these vulnerabilities is 
well known, an understanding of the second has only recently begun to be developed.
30 Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 2013, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2012–13, 
ACLEI, Canberra, p. 73.
31 Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 2014, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2013–14, 
ACLEI, Canberra, p. 93.
32 Transparency International Australia assesses that the decline may be attributed to the prosecution of Securency 
and Note Printing Australia executives, and the findings of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 
relation to Eddie Obeid and the corruption in the New South Wales Government at the time.
33 Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 2013, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2012–13, 
ACLEI, Canberra, p. 5.
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Social networking, the sharing of personal information on social media, and casual 
attitudes and the apparent growing tolerance of the general public toward ‘recreational’ 
or ‘private’ illicit drug-taking have been identified as having the potential to significantly 
increase the risk of corruption of younger public sector employees by bringing them into 
contact with organised crime groups.34
The Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) has observed that 
long-term friendships between public officials and those involved in criminal activity 
can lead to corruption. In one investigation, ACLEI noted that a network ‘shared some 
common demographics, including school links, age and community ties. These same links 
and sources of obligation extended to friends who were active members in organised 
crime groups, including outlaw motorcycle gangs.’35 ACLEI found that this common 
background allowed the corrupt group to expand with a level of confidence.
ACLEI has also observed an apparent willingness by public sector employees found to 
have indulged in illicit drug use—particularly cocaine—to construct a personal outlook 
that artificially demarcates their private lives (socialising with other drug users and 
drug dealers) from their professional responsibilities (interdicting drugs and taking 
enforcement action against those involved).36 Importantly, at least some of these 
employees appear to see nothing wrong with living what amounts to a double life. ACLEI 
investigations have also suggested that some employees who engage in illicit drug use 
have responded to the introduction of mandatory random drug-testing schemes by 
adopting measures designed to defeat drug tests.37
Inappropriate relationships are consistently identified in corruption investigations. 
These relationships can develop opportunistically or through deliberate targeting on 
the part of organised crime. Corrupt public sector officials have been observed to target 
their colleagues by building trust, social obligation and complicity over time. A network 
increases the corrupt officer’s capability to engage in corrupt conduct, while increasing 
the opportunity for concealment. Corrupt networks of this type are of significant value 
to the business model of organised crime groups.
ACLEI has noted that the resignation or removal of a public official from the workplace 
does not always put a stop to the influence that former officials are able to exert over 
employees who remain in the workplace, and who may continue to service the needs of 
organised crime entities.38
34 Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 2013, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2012–13, 
ACLEI, Canberra, p. 73.
35 Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 2013, Operation Heritage—a joint investigation of alleged 
corrupt conduct among officers of the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service at Sydney International 
Airport (Interim Report), Investigation Report 02-2013, viewed 13 January 2015, <http://www.aclei.gov.au/
Documents/Reports%20submissions%20and%20speeches/Report022013-OperationHeritageinterimreport.pdf>.
36 Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 2013, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2012–13, 
ACLEI, Canberra, p. 94.
37 Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 2014, Operation Myrrh—an investigation into “private” 
illicit drug use by certain Australian Customs and Border Protection Service officers, Investigation Report 01-2014, 
viewed 3 March 2015, <http://www.aclei.gov.au/Documents/Reports%20submissions%20and%20speeches/
Report012014AninvestigationintoprivateillicitdrugusebycertainAustralianCustomsandBorderProtectionServiceofficers.pdf>.
38 Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 2013, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2012–13, 
ACLEI, Canberra, p. 95.
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Self-initiated corruption by individual public sector officials also occurs. Positions of 
power and authority are exploited for personal financial gain and, at times, government 
officials will actively engage others in the private and public sector to facilitate their 
corrupt activities. Although this kind of self-initiated corruption does not involve or is not 
necessarily influenced by organised crime, it still contributes to undermining confidence 
in the integrity of public sector services and opens these corrupt individuals to being 
compromised by organised crime.
A broader threat to Australian public sector integrity is posed by acts of foreign bribery. 
Australia-based corporate bodies operating offshore and bribing foreign officials may be 
more likely or willing than other corporate bodies to attempt to engage in this type of 
activity in Australia (see the case study above).
In addition, organised crime and overseas-based companies may see corrupt activity 
undertaken by Australian businesses offshore as a sign that corruption of officials is 
considered an appropriate business strategy in Australia, leading to an increase in 
attempts to corrupt Australian public sector officials based overseas and domestically.
The increased awareness of foreign bribery issues led the AFP to establish an internal 
Foreign Bribery Panel of Experts in 2012. In early 2013, the AFP established the Fraud and 
Anti-Corruption Centre to focus on foreign bribery offences and, in May 2013, it joined an 
International Foreign Bribery Taskforce. The purpose of the taskforce is to enable countries 
to work collaboratively to strengthen investigations into foreign bribery claims.
CASE STUDY 
FOREIGN BRIBERY
An Australian Federal Police (AFP) investigation into allegations that employees of an 
Australia-based construction company had paid bribes to government officials in Iraq 
has led to charges being laid against three men for conspiracy to bribe a foreign public 
official. Police will allege that almost A$1 million was transferred overseas for payment of 
these bribes. One of these men has also been charged with a money laundering offence.1
1 Australian Federal Police 2015, ‘Man arrested for foreign bribery’, media release, 20 February 2015, viewed 26 
February 2015, <http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/news/afp/2015/february/media-release-man-arrested-for-
foreign-bribery>.
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The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime notes that there is a broad consensus 
among academics, practitioners and politicians that corruption is one of the main obstacles 
to peace, stability, sustainable development, democracy and human rights globally.
Violence
Introduction
Violence is a key enabler of organised crime–related activities such as extortion, 
intimidation and crimes against the person. Violence is used by organised crime to gain 
or retain control of ‘turf’, to ensure an ongoing stake in illicit markets, as punishment or 
retaliation for slights or misdeeds, and to collect debts or to send a warning. Violence 
may also be offered as a contracted and paid service to other crime groups. In some 
instances, individual group members are permitted to exploit the group’s reputation for 
violence for their own personal profit or gain.
Serious and organised crime groups’ use of violence puts lives at risk and, in those 
instances in which organised crime–related violence is played out in public, violates 
community safety and diminishes public confidence in law enforcement and 
governments. The potential harm to the public from violence related to organised crime 
will increase as organised crime groups become more habituated to committing acts of 
violence in public spaces.
There is considerable pressure on governments and law enforcement to combat the use 
of violence by organised crime, with some jurisdictions recently introducing legislation 
aimed at reducing violence and increasing penalties for violent offences.
Current situation
Violent incidents involving serious and organised crime reported in the media are 
frequently ‘street crime’ or opportunistic crime, such as alcohol-related incidents and 
individually targeted violence. However, in recent years there has been an escalation 
in outlaw motorcycle gang (OMCG)-driven violence, particularly in the public domain, 
between rival gangs and, at times, between members of the same OMCG. Often, this 
violence can put members of the public at risk as well (see the case study on page 33).
Disputes between rival OMCG clubs almost always act as a catalyst for subsequent 
violent events of retaliation and retribution.
Notably, OMCGs have been reported to recruit new members and associates who  
have specialist capabilities that can be used in committing violent crime. For example, 
ex-army personnel with specialist expertise in the use of explosives and weaponry may 
be actively targeted for recruitment.
Extortion rackets have also been a well-recorded criminal business of organised crime 
groups, particularly of some OMCG members. Physical violence, intimidation and 
harassment are synonymous with extortion activities, and may continue to affect victims 
even after the extorted debt is settled.
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The building industry has experienced the use, and threats, of violence through verbal 
violence and extortion. It is understood that links between organised crime and some 
people in the building industry have been used to exert pressure and standover tactics in 
order to influence the outcome of lucrative building and labour contracts.39
39 Oakes, D 2014, ‘CFMEU rocked by claims of corrupt dealing with crime figures in exchange for construction contracts’, 
ABC News, 28 January 2014, viewed 5 February 2015, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-01-28/union-accused-of-
ties-to-crime-figures-kickbacks-for-jobs/5221234>.
CASE STUDY 
OMCG VIOLENCE
In April 2012, an OMCG member was responsible for a public shooting at a shopping 
centre on the Gold Coast, with a rival OMCG member as the target. The rival OMCG 
member and an innocent bystander in the shopping centre were shot and wounded. The 
lawyer for the OMCG member argued that the firearm was used in self-defence because 
the rival OMCG member was wielding a knife.1 In November 2014, the OMCG member 
was convicted of attempted murder and unlawful wounding as a result of this incident.
In September 2013, a large public brawl occurred between members and associates 
of two rival OMCGs at a Gold Coast restaurant. Other diners at the restaurant moved 
quickly to escape the violence. Following the arrests resulting from the incident, a large 
group of OMCG members gathered outside the police station where arrested members 
were being held, as a reported demonstration of intimidation against police.2 Forty-three 
people were charged with 52 offences as a result of the brawl.
In October 2013, another violent brawl occurred between rival OMCGs at a café on the 
Gold Coast. Members of the public were also present at the time of this incident. It was 
reported that no one was injured as a result of this incident.
1 ‘Robina shooter and Mongols bikie Mark James Graham gets 12 years for attempted murder and unlawful wounding’, 
Gold Coast Bulletin, 3 November 2014, viewed 20 January 2015, <http://www.goldcoastbulletin.com.au/news/crime-
court/robina-shooter-and-mongols-bikie-mark-james-graham-gets-12-years-for-attempted-murder-and-unlawful-
wounding/story-fnje8bkv-1227110457871>.
2 Ravn, M, Westthorp, T & Laughlin, S 2013, ‘Eighteen bikies arrested after Broadbeach brawl’, Gold Coast Bulletin, 28 
September 2013, viewed 15 January 2015, <http://www.goldcoastbulletin.com.au/news/crime-court/eighteen-bikies-
arrested-after-broadbeach-brawl/story-fnje8bkv-1226774457240>.
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The contracting of organised crime by casino junket operators for debt collection from 
casino ‘high-roller’ clients through the use of, or at least the threat of, violence has also been 
reported overseas.40 Organised crime–driven violence in high-density gambling locations 
such as Macau is reported to have thrived through debt collection pressures on indebted 
high-rollers. With new Australian casinos reported to be marketing to attract international 
casino junket tours,41 it is possible that junket tour operators may seek to employ serious 
and organised crime as contracted standover debt collectors here in Australia.
40 ‘Organised crime linked to high roller gamblers: concerns for new Australian casinos’, News.com.au, 15 September 
2014, viewed 15 January 2015, <http://www.news.com.au/finance/money/organised-crime-linked-to-high-roller-
gamblers-concerns-for-new-australian-casinos/story-e6frfmci-1227058972551>; Nicholls, S 2014, ‘Secret Packer 
casino organised crime agreement should be public, independent arbiter finds’, Sydney Morning Herald, 22 October 
2014, viewed 28 January 2015, <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/secret-packer-casino-organised-crime-agreement-
should-be-public-independent-arbiter-finds-20141022-119tg9.html>.
41 Nicholls, S 2014, ‘Secret Packer casino organised crime agreement should be public, independent arbiter finds’, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 22 October 2014, viewed 28 January 2015, <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/secret-packer-
casino-organised-crime-agreement-should-be-public-independent-arbiter-finds-20141022-119tg9.html>.
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ILLICIT COMMODITIES
Illicit drug market overview
The Australian illicit drug market remains highly lucrative, with the demand for a wide 
variety of illicit drugs growing. Poly-drug use remains a feature of the Australian drug 
market, and serious and organised crime groups capitalise on the demand for multiple 
drug types by importing, producing or trafficking in several drug types simultaneously.
The Australian illicit drug market is best seen as a component of a global market. The 
Internet and ‘darknets’ have enabled the rapid expansion of the global drug market, 
and users can access both drugs, and information about new drugs becoming available, 
online from anywhere in the world. This has meant that trends in drug use observed in 
Europe, Canada and the United States—those markets most similar to the Australian 
market—which once would have taken some time to flow on to the Australian market, 
are now very quickly replicated in Australia.
Although cannabis remains the most commonly used illicit drug in Australia, with 
organised crime playing a fundamental role in its large-scale cultivation and distribution, 
the methylamphetamine market poses the highest risk to Australia, and serious and 
organised crime groups are entrenched in the market.
The Australian methylamphetamine market has traditionally been supplied 
by domestically produced product. However, large-scale importations of 
methylamphetamine, particularly crystalline methylamphetamine, as well as precursor 
chemicals, are also being detected at the border. This is evidence of an increase in 
the involvement of transnational organised crime groups in the market, in an effort to 
capitalise on the profits to be made from the sale of methylamphetamine to a large 
and expanding market. Users of methylamphetamine are at an increased risk of health-
related harms, and the drug can cause violence and aggression, placing those around 
them at risk of harm as well.
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Both the global and the Australian 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA, or 
‘ecstasy’) markets continue to regenerate after a period of well-documented shortage. 
The seizure in November 2014 of almost 2 tonnes of MDMA imported into Australia 
from Europe is a further indicator of the return of large-scale MDMA manufacture in 
Europe, as well as the continued recovery of the Australian MDMA market.
Other ‘traditional’ illicit drugs, such as cocaine, heroin and cannabis, still feature 
in the Australian market; however, newer substances designed to mimic the effect 
of traditional illicit drugs—referred to in this report as drug analogues and new 
psychoactive substances (DANPS)—continue to gain traction. The rapid development of 
the DANPS market is unprecedented in global illicit drug markets, with 348 substances 
having been officially reported to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime by the 
end of 2013. Often incorrectly marketed as ‘legal’ and ‘safe’ alternatives to illicit drugs, 
DANPS have been linked to the deaths of several Australian users in recent years.
Organised Crime in Australia 2015 is not intended to provide a comprehensive picture 
of the Australian illicit drug markets. Detailed overviews of each of the Australian illicit 
drug markets can be found in the Australian Crime Commission’s Illicit Drug Data Report 
2013–14.
Methylamphetamine
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that amphetamine-type 
stimulants (ATS), of which methylamphetamine is one, are the second most commonly 
used illicit drug globally.42 In the 2013 National Drug Strategy Household Survey,  
‘meth/amphetamines’43 were reported as the third most commonly used drug, behind 
cannabis and 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA).44 However, innovative 
research methodologies, such as the analysis of wastewater (sewage), are likely to 
indicate a much wider use of methylamphetamine in the community. The Australian 
Crime Commission has assessed the methylamphetamine market as the highest risk drug 
market in Australia for several years.
In Australia, methylamphetamine has been observed in powder (‘speed’), base and 
crystalline (‘ice’) forms. Ice use appears to be growing, and many users see ice as the 
most desirable form of methylamphetamine. This is partly because it is incorrectly 
perceived to be a purer form of the drug, and partly because it can be smoked rather 
than requiring intravenous injection. This method of administration may appeal to those 
users who do not consider themselves to be drug users, and may be a contributor to 
the expansion of the market. The onset of the effects of ice occur more quickly through 
smoking, and ice users may be more likely to demonstrate antisocial behaviours, such as 
violence, than users of other drugs.
42 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2014, World Drug Report 2014, UNODC, Vienna.
43 Includes both methylamphetamine and amphetamine.
44 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2014, National Drug Strategy Household Survey detailed report 2013, Drug 
Statistics Series no. 28, Cat. no. PHE 183, AIHW, Canberra.
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In a 2014 survey of injecting drug users, 70 per cent of the sample reported that they 
had used any form of methylamphetamine in the previous six months.45 This was the 
second most commonly reported illicit drug used behind cannabis.46 Although reported 
use of powder and base was stable, there was a significant increase in reported use 
of ice, up from 55 per cent to 61 per cent of the sample.47 The use of ice has been an 
increasing trend in the annual survey since 2009, when an all-time low of 37 per cent 
was reported.48
The Australian methylamphetamine market has traditionally been supplied by 
domestically produced methylamphetamine. In recent years, however, there has been 
a significant increase in the number of detections of ice at the Australian border (see 
Table 1). Two of the detections alone accounted for 386 kilograms of ice—203 kilograms 
concealed in an importation of truck tyres detected in September 2013,49 and 
183 kilograms detected in a consignment of sea kayaks in February 2014.50 Furthermore, 
in November 2014, six men were arrested for the attempted importation of more than 
800 kilograms of ice and almost 2 tonnes of MDMA (for further information on this 
detection, refer to the case study on page 46).
Table 1: Number and weight of ATS and ice detections at the Australian border,  
2011–12 to 2013–1451
Detections (number) Weight (kg)a
2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14
Ice 171 1,084 1,379 160.20 1,446.24 1,435.36
Other ATSb 907 915 988 187.39 692.30 376.98
a. Weight shown in the above table is an estimate. Weight is calculated using 0.29 grams per tablet where a weight was 
not available. Some small-quantity shipments of ATS do not have a weight recorded.
b. Includes amphetamines and methylamphetamines in liquid, capsule, paste, powder or tablet form. Figures do not 
include MDMA or crystalline methylamphetamine (ice).
45 Stafford, J & Burns, L 2014, Key findings from the 2014 IDRS: a survey of people who inject drugs, Illicit Drug Reporting 
System Drug Trends Bulletin, October 2014, National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, University of New South 
Wales, Sydney.
46 ibid.
47 ibid.
48 ibid.
49 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 2013, ‘Three arrested for importing more than 200kg of 
methamphetamine in truck tyres’, media release, 11 October 2013, viewed 12 February 2015, <http://newsroom.
customs.gov.au/channels/Drugs-and-steroids/releases/three-arrested-for-importing-more-than-200kg-of-
methamphetamine-in-truck-tyres>.
50 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 2014, ‘Drugs worth $180 million found in kayaks, five people 
arrested’, media release, 12 February 2014, viewed 12 February 2015, <http://newsroom.customs.gov.au/channels/
Drugs-and-steroids/releases/c6b6d870-0338-43df-8add-bfb012aaf939>.
51 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 2014, Annual Report 2013–14, ACBPS, Canberra.
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This increase in border detections does not appear to have coincided with a decrease 
in domestic production, as there are still significant precursor chemical and clandestine 
laboratory detections occurring. For example, 10 people were arrested and 1.9 tonnes 
of a mixture of vanilla powder and the methylamphetamine precursor pseudoephedrine 
were seized during an 18-month joint agency investigation that concluded in October 
2013.52 It is alleged three of those arrested were responsible for distributing the 
pseudoephedrine–vanilla mix to multiple criminal syndicates within Australia, who 
would then use it to make methylamphetamine in clandestine laboratories.53 The large 
increase in border detections, coupled with the ongoing domestic production, suggests 
that transnational organised crime groups have recognised the strong Australian demand 
for methylamphetamine and have moved into this lucrative market.
There is significant organised crime involvement in the importation, manufacture and 
supply of methylamphetamine in Australia. Many of these groups are involved in a 
range of other activities in addition to methylamphetamine (see the case study on 
page 39). More than 60 per cent of entities on the National Criminal Target List54 are 
involved in the methylamphetamine and/or precursor markets, and of these more 
than 80 per cent are also involved in other drug markets. Because there are a number 
of routes of synthesis requiring a range of precursor chemicals, groups involved in 
methylamphetamine production can adapt quickly to changes in precursor availability or 
regulatory controls.
Methylamphetamine is highly addictive and users, particularly the users of crystal 
methylamphetamine, are at increased risk of a range of health-related harms—most 
notably increased risk of psychosis and other mental illness. Other harms include 
headaches, anxiety, paranoia, vision problems, hallucinations, tremors and stroke.  
Long-term use can result in memory loss, aggression and increased risk of heart failure 
and stroke.
Users and manufacturers are particularly vulnerable to a range of hazards associated 
with the clandestine manufacture of illicit drugs. Children present in the homes 
of methylamphetamine users or manufacturers are particularly at risk of ingesting 
associated chemicals, with one study finding forensic evidence that such children 
who had experienced ‘low-level’ environmental exposure to methylamphetamine 
and its manufacture had metabolised as much methylamphetamine as adult users.55 
Methylamphetamine manufacture in clandestine laboratories has resulted in explosions 
that have severely damaged properties and resulted in serious injuries and death. These 
labs are often located in residential areas, posing a risk to the surrounding community.
52 Australian Crime Commission, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Australian Federal Police &Victoria 
Police 2013, ‘International drug syndicate disrupted following joint taskforce investigation’, joint media release, 21 
October 2013, viewed 12 February 2015, <https://www.crimecommission.gov.au/media-centre/release/australian-
crime-commission-joint-media-release/international-drug-syndicate>.
53 ibid.
54 The National Criminal Target List is a national listing of currently active and nationally significant organised criminal 
groups operating in Australia, and is contributed to by Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement agencies. 
The total number of entities listed is classified.
55 Bassindale, T 2012, ‘Quantitative analysis of methamphetamine in hair of children removed from clandestine 
laboratories—evidence of passive exposure?’, Forensic Science International, vol. 219, no. 1, pp. 179–82.
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Precursor chemicals
Precursor chemicals are essential for illicit drug production. The chemicals required 
vary depending on the type of drug being produced and the production process used. 
Strong demand for illicit drugs, and the significant profits to be made from trafficking 
precursor chemicals used to produce these drugs, sustain organised crime involvement 
in this market. The majority of precursors seized in Australia are used in the production 
of methylamphetamine—namely pseudoephedrine and ephedrine. Detections of 
precursors for 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA, or ‘ecstasy’) and other 
amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) have occurred, with minimal detection of precursors 
associated with other drug production or extraction.
CASE STUDY 
ORGANISED CRIME GROUP INVOLVED IN 
METHYLAMPHETAMINE PRECURSOR AND 
FIREARM TRAFFICKING1
In October 2014, the Australian Federal Police (AFP), Queensland Police Service (QPS) 
and Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS) conducted a number 
of raids in North Queensland and the Torres Strait, dismantling an organised crime 
syndicate that had allegedly imported 10 litres of the methylamphetamine precursor 
phenyl-2-propanone (P2P) into Australia, and attempted to export firearms into Papua 
New Guinea.
The group was identified in May 2014 when the AFP targeted smuggling networks 
operating out of Daru in Papua New Guinea and across the Torres Strait into North 
Queensland. It is alleged they imported 7 litres of P2P from Papua New Guinea into 
Australia via the Torres Strait in two separate importations during August and September 
2014. A further 3 litres of P2P were seized during the raids. It was also alleged that 
the group attempted to export three firearms from Australia into Papua New Guinea 
in August 2014. The group was also linked to two large cannabis plantations that were 
detected in October 2014 in North Queensland.
1 Australian Federal Police & Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 2014, ‘Police seize “Ice” precursor, 
firearms and cannabis crops, eight people charged’, joint media release, 20 October 2014, viewed 12 February 2015, 
<http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/news/afp/2014/october/media-release-police-seize-ice-precursor-firearms-
and-cannabis-crops-eight-people-charged>.
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Large amounts of precursor chemicals continue to be seized at the border (see the 
case study on page 41), with China and India, in particular, being identified as primary 
source countries. Precursor chemicals are also diverted domestically from the legitimate 
chemical supply chain. An emerging importation methodology is precursor masking, in 
which the chemical structure of the substance is altered to avoid detection at the border.
In 2013–14, the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service detected 1,170 
attempted precursor importations, 88 per cent of which were precursors for the 
production of amphetamine-type stimulants.56 Although the numbers are relatively 
low, there has been an increase in detections of precursors for gamma-hydroxybutyrate 
(GHB), increasing from 47 detections in 2011–12 to 104 detections in 2013–14.57
Cocaine
The majority of the world’s coca cultivation occurs in the South American countries of 
Colombia,58 Bolivia59 and Peru,60 with global coca cultivation fluctuating in recent years. 
Despite a 17.5 per cent decrease between 2012 and 2013, Peru has remained the largest 
global coca cultivator (ahead of Colombia) for the second year in a row.
In line with these figures, of the seizures analysed, most cocaine seized at the Australian 
border originates from coca grown in Colombia or Peru. Small amounts of cocaine from 
Bolivia, or of mixed origin, have also been detected.61
The Australian cocaine market varies across jurisdictions, with the majority of cocaine 
use occurring in New South Wales and Victoria.62 However, it remains difficult to obtain 
an accurate estimate of the prevalence of cocaine use among the general population 
because of the ‘hidden’ nature of much of the user base (as cocaine users are less likely 
to come to the attention of authorities), and less cocaine appears to be used in Australia 
compared with other illicit stimulants. Innovative research strategies, such as the analysis 
of wastewater (sewage), have been used in Europe to monitor illicit drug use trends and 
compare drug use in different cities, or across different time periods.63 These types of 
strategies have also been used in some parts of Australia, albeit to a lesser extent, and may 
provide a more accurate picture of the prevalence of cocaine use, as neither cocaine nor its 
metabolite is produced by consumption of other drugs or environmental sources.64
56 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 2014, Annual Report 2013–14, ACBPS, Canberra.
57 ibid.
58 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2014, Colombia coca cultivation survey 2013, United Nations, Colombia.
59 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2014, Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia monitoreo de cultivo de coca 2013, 
United Nations, Bolivia.
60 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2014, Monitoreo de cultivos de coca 2013, United Nations, Peru.
61 Australian Crime Commission 2014, Illicit Drug Data Report 2012–13, ACC, Canberra.
62 Roxburgh, A, Ritter, A, Slade, T & Burns, L 2013, Trends in drug use and related harms in Australia, 2001 to 2013, 
National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
63 Gerrity, D, Trenhom, RA & Snyder, SA 2011, ‘Temporal variability of pharmaceuticals and illicit drugs in wastewater 
and the effects of a major sporting event’, Water Research, vol. 45, no. 17 (November 2011), pp. 5399–411.
64 Prichard, J, Lai, FY, Kirkbride, P, Bruno, R, Ort, C, Carter, S, Hall, W, Gartner, C, Thai, PK & Mueller, JF 2012, Measuring 
drug use patterns in Queensland through wastewater analysis, Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice no. 
442, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra.
41
ORGANISED CRIME IN AUSTRALIA 2015 
AUSTRALIAN CRIME COMMISSION
Over the last 20 years, there has been a steady increase in the number of respondents to 
the 2013 National Drug Strategy Household Survey reporting they had ever used cocaine, 
up from 2.5 per cent in 1993 to 8.1 per cent in 2013.65 The proportion of respondents 
reporting cocaine use in the 12 months prior to interview is much smaller, but still the 
equal highest on record, at just 2.1 per cent of the Australian population.
Analysis of annual drug user survey results between 2001 and 2013 shows fluctuations in 
patterns of reported recent cocaine use at the time of the survey. Among injecting drug 
users, there has been a significant decline in recent cocaine use, as well as a decrease in 
the proportion reporting cocaine use weekly or more often. 
65 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2014, National Drug Strategy Household Survey detailed report 2013, Drug 
Statistics Series no. 28, Cat. no. PHE 183, AIHW, Canberra.
CASE STUDY 
ATTEMPTED IMPORTATION OF 50 LITRES OF 
PSEUDOEPHEDRINE1
In June 2013, the Australian Crime Commission disseminated intelligence to the 
Australian Federal Police relating to a possible importation of precursor chemicals 
through a chemical supply business, alleged to have been set up solely to mask the 
importation of the restricted precursor.
In August 2014, Customs officers inspected a consignment of chemicals ordered by 
the company. During this inspection, 10 five-litre drums containing pseudoephedrine 
suspended in liquid form were detected. Based on the purity, the precursor seized could 
have been used to produce methylamphetamine worth almost A$10 million.
The joint-agency investigation continued until late October 2014, when search warrants 
were carried out in Adelaide and Sydney. Two men were arrested and charged with the 
importation.
1 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Australian Crime Commission, Australian Federal Police & South 
Australia Police 2014, ‘Joint operation sees two men charged with importing precursor chemicals’, joint media release, 
22 October 2014, viewed 15 January 2015, <http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/news/afp/2014/october/joint-
operation-sees-two-men-charged-with-importing-precursor-chemicals.aspx>.
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However, during the same period, recent cocaine use among regular ecstasy and related 
drug users increased from 23 per cent in 2003 to a peak of 48 per cent in 2010, then 
declining to 30 per cent in 2013.66 In 2014, this proportion increased significantly to 
44 per cent, with all states except Western Australia reporting an increase.67 It is unclear 
why there has been a difference in cocaine use between these two groups over time, 
but factors such as the different demographics of the samples, differing levels of income 
and/or drug preference, or reduced availability within the injecting drug user market are 
likely contributors.
There is significant organised crime involvement in the Australian cocaine market, 
with a diverse range of organised crime groups being identified in the importation and 
trafficking of cocaine. The Australian Customs and Border Protection Service made 1,512 
detections of cocaine, weighing 245.57 kilograms, in 2013–14.68 This was a reduction 
from the 2,003 detections weighing 399.69 kilograms in 2012–13.69
Heroin
The majority of the world’s illicit opium poppy cultivation occurs in South West and 
South East Asia and Latin America. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
estimates that, globally, in 2013 there were more than 296,000 hectares of opium 
under cultivation—the highest level in more than 10 years.70 Afghanistan is the leading 
cultivator and producer of opium globally. Between 2013 and 2014, opium poppy 
cultivation in Afghanistan increased by 7 per cent and the estimated potential opium 
production in Afghanistan increased 17 per cent, from 5,500 tonnes to 6,400 tonnes. 
Typically, opium is converted into heroin in, or close to, the countries where the opium 
poppy is cultivated, although poppy eradication and opium and morphine seizures are 
reported in a wide range of countries other than the main opium-producing countries.
Historically, the Australian heroin market has been supplied with heroin originating 
from South East Asia. However, South West Asian heroin has been detected in varying 
proportions over the last decade. In 2011, South West Asian heroin accounted for  
51 per cent of the number of border detections analysed, before dropping back to  
26 per cent in 2012.71
There is significant organised crime involvement in the importation and distribution of 
heroin in Australia. There has been a general downward trend in the number of heroin 
detections at the Australian border since 2006–07, while the weight of those detections 
has fluctuated. In 2013–14, the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service made 
180 detections of heroin, weighing 118.89 kilograms.72 This was a reduction from the  
237 detections weighing 513.82 kilograms in the previous year.73
66 Roxburgh, A, Ritter, A, Slade, T & Burns, L 2013, Trends in drug use and related harms in Australia, 2001 to 
2013,National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
67 Sindicich, N & Burns, L 2014, An overview of the 2014 Ecstasy and Related Drugs Reporting System, EDRS Drug Trends 
Bulletin, October 2014, National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
68 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 2014, Annual Report 2013–14, ACBPS, Canberra.
69 ibid.
70 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2014, World Drug Report 2014, United Nations, Vienna.
71 Australian Crime Commission 2014, Illicit Drug Data Report 2012–13, ACC, Canberra.
72 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 2014, Annual Report 2013–14, ACBPS, Canberra.
73 ibid.
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Determining the level of heroin use in the general population is difficult because users 
are often not captured in general population surveys. In the 2013 National Drug Strategy 
Household Survey, only 0.1 per cent of Australians reported heroin use in the preceding 
year.74 This proportion has been steadily decreasing since 1998.
Domestic market indicators suggest that the Australian heroin market has remained 
stable and consists of an entrenched and ageing user population. Analysis of the 2014 
Illicit Drug Reporting System data indicated that, among injecting drug users, heroin was 
the most commonly reported drug of choice and the drug injected most often in the 
month before the survey.75 Further analysis indicated that those who had recently used 
heroin were significantly more likely than those who had not recently used heroin to 
have begun injecting drugs earlier in life, to have a longer injecting drug use history, to 
be currently in drug treatment, to have a prison history, to have injected at least daily in 
the previous month, to have very high psychological distress levels, and to have riskier 
injecting practices.76
Drug analogues and new psychoactive substances
Drug analogues and new psychoactive substances (DANPS) are synthetically created 
substances that have a similar chemical structure to an illicit drug, or that mimic the 
effects of illicit drugs. Often (incorrectly) referred to as ‘legal’ alternatives to proscribed 
substances, DANPS are also known as novel substances, novel psychotropic substances, 
emerging psychoactive substances, analogues, mimetics, legal highs, new synthetics, 
synthetics, herbal highs or designer drugs,77 and they comprise a range of substances, 
including stimulants, hallucinogens, anaesthetics and cannabimimetics (also known as 
synthetic cannabinoids).
There continues to be an increasing range of DANPS manufactured and distributed to the 
market. The number of DANPS on the global market more than doubled between 2009 
and 2013, with 348 substances being reported to the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime by the end of 2013.78
DANPS have been available in the Australian market since the mid-2000s, but have 
increased in availability and popularity in recent years. In 2013, the National Drug 
Strategy Household Survey included the new categories of ‘synthetic cannabinoids’ and 
other ‘new and emerging psychoactive substances’ for the first time. Reported use was 
relatively low in the general population, with 1.2 per cent of the population reporting 
synthetic cannabinoid use and 0.4 per cent reporting use of other new and emerging 
psychoactive substances in the previous 12 months. However, this level of use is similar 
to that reported for hallucinogens and tranquillisers, and much higher than the reported 
use of other illicit drugs such as heroin, ketamine and gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB). 
74 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2014, National Drug Strategy Household Survey detailed report 2013, Drug 
Statistics Series no. 28, Cat. no. PHE 183, AIHW, Canberra.
75 McIlwraith, F, Hickey, S & Alati, R 2014, What’s happening with heroin?, Illicit Drug Reporting System Drug Trends 
Bulletin, December 2014, National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
76 ibid.
77 Australian Crime Commission 2014, Illicit Drug Data Report 2012–13, ACC, Canberra.
78 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2014, World Drug Report 2014, UNODC, Vienna.
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Less than 5 per cent of recent synthetic cannabinoid users reported having not used any 
other illicit drug during the same 12-month period.79
Results from the 2014 Ecstasy and Related Drugs Reporting System (EDRS) survey show 
that recent use of ‘new psychoactive substances’80 remained stable at 36 per cent of 
the national sample. For the first time, respondents were asked if they had specifically 
sought out new psychoactive substances or if they had been offered them by others. 
Half of the sample (50 per cent) reported specifically seeking out new psychoactive 
substances, suggesting that these substances are not simply used to supplement illicit 
drug use, but may also be sought out as alternatives to illicit use of other drugs.81
There was a significant decrease in EDRS respondents reporting recent use of synthetic 
cannabinoids between 2013 and 2014 (from 16 per cent to 7 per cent). It is believed 
that this decline in use is related to users’ negative reports about both the high and the 
comedown after using the substances.82
DANPS are often marketed as ‘safe’ alternatives to illicit drugs. However, DANPS have 
been linked to a number of deaths in Australia and overseas. In January 2015, the 
deaths of two men in Queensland were believed to be linked to the use of synthetic 
cannabinoids.
Production of DANPS at a commercial level has been detected in Australia, including 
production by people with no prior history of drug use or supply.83 There is a low level of 
organised crime involvement in the importation and supply of DANPS to the Australian 
market. The Internet is also a major facilitator, providing a medium for sales, information 
sharing and social commentary on substances.
MDMA
The global market for 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA, or ‘ecstasy’) is 
continuing to resurge after a well-documented period of reduced availability. In August 
and October 2013, European authorities dismantled the two largest clandestine MDMA 
laboratories ever detected in Europe. Several tonnes of the precursor safrole and more 
than 1 tonne of crystal MDMA were seized at the first laboratory,84 while 35 tonnes of 
precursors and other chemicals were seized from the second laboratory.85 
79 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2014, National Drug Strategy Household Survey detailed report 2013, Drug 
Statistics Series no. 28, Cat. no. PHE 183, AIHW, Canberra.
80 The EDRS category of ‘new psychoactive substances’ does not include synthetic cannabinoids, but does include 
dimethyltryptamine, which is dealt with in the tryptamines chapter of this document.
81 Sindicich, N & Burns, L 2014, An overview of the 2014 Ecstasy and Related Drugs Reporting System, EDRS Drug Trends 
Bulletin, October 2014, National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
82 ibid.
83 Crime and Corruption Commission 2015, New synthetic drugs—deceptive and dangerous, CCC, Brisbane.
84 Europol 2013, ‘Largest ecstasy lab ever found in Europe dismantled’, media release, 28 August 2013, viewed 12 
December 2014, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/largest-ecstasy-lab-ever-found-europe-dismantled>.
85 Europol 2013, ‘Police discover largest synthetic drugs production site ever found in EU’, media release, 23 October 
2013, , viewed 12 December 2014, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/police-discover-largest-synthetic-drugs-
production-site-ever-found-eu>.
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In both instances, the laboratories had been established in rural farming areas in 
Belgium. The sheer size of the laboratories, a large increase in seizures of precursor 
chemicals in Europe and a warning in February 2014 about tablets detected in the 
Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Switzerland containing potentially fatal 
levels of MDMA86 are clear indications that MDMA production in Europe has increased 
significantly.
The Australian MDMA market, as a component of the global MDMA market, is also 
regenerating. Though the number and weight of MDMA detections at the Australian 
border fell from 4,139 detections weighing 149.27 kilograms in 2012–13 to 3,247 
detections weighing 94.82 kilograms in 2013–14, the 2013–14 figures are nonetheless 
significantly higher than the 964 detections weighing 11.95 kilograms in 2011–12.87 A 
further indicator of resurgence in the global and domestic MDMA markets is the seizure 
of almost 2 tonnes of MDMA in New South Wales in November 2014—the second-largest 
seizure of MDMA in Australian history (see the case study on page 46).
Although the majority of MDMA consumed in Australia is imported, seizures of precursor 
chemicals domestically and at the border, and detections of clandestine laboratories, 
indicate some level of domestic production. The annual number of detections of MDMA 
clandestine laboratories in Australia is low, with just seven being detected in 2012–13 
(less than 1 per cent of all clandestine laboratory detections that year).88
The 2013 National Drug Strategy Household Survey reported a decrease in the 
proportion of the population who had used MDMA in the previous 12 months (from 
3 per cent in 2010 to 2.5 per cent in 2013), but it is still the second most commonly 
used drug in Australia.89 MDMA is most commonly consumed in tablet form, but in 2014 
there was a significant increase in the number of regular users reporting the use of 
crystal MDMA in the Ecstasy and Related Drugs Reporting System (EDRS) survey.90 Crystal 
MDMA is absorbed into the digestive system at a higher rate than in pill or powder form, 
and as a result users experience a stronger ‘peak’ effect and longer-lasting after-effects.91 
It is unclear when crystal MDMA was introduced to the Australian market, but its use has 
been reported in the EDRS since 2012.92
86 Europol and European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Addiction 2014, ‘Tablets with dangerously high levels of 
MDMA’, Early Warning Notification 2014/6, viewed 12 December 2014, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/
default/files/publications/ewn_high_concentration_mdma_feb_2014_-_public.pdf>.
87 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 2014, Annual Report 2013–14, ACBPS, Canberra.
88 Australian Crime Commission 2014, Illicit Drug Data Report 2012–13, ACC, Canberra.
89 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2014, National Drug Strategy Household Survey detailed report 2013, Drug 
Statistics Series no. 28, Cat. no. PHE 183, AIHW, Canberra.
90 Sindicich, N & Burns, L 2014, An overview of the 2014 Ecstasy and Related Drugs Reporting System, EDRS Drug Trends 
Bulletin, October 2014, National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
91 Entwistle, G & Burns, L 2014, ‘Crystal MDMA: a unique addition to Australian markets’, National Drug Trends 
Conference poster presentation, viewed 12 December 2014, <https://ndarc.med.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/
newsevents/events/Poster%20(NSW%20EDRS)%20-%20Crystal%20MDMA.pdf>.
92 ibid.
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Cannabis
Cannabis is cultivated in almost every country of the world, and is the most commonly 
produced and used illicit drug globally.93 The cannabis market is the largest illicit drug 
market in Australia, with Australian use reported to be above the global average.94 The 
2013 National Drug Strategy Household Survey reported that more than one in three 
Australians had ever used cannabis in their lifetime, and one in 10 had used it in the 
previous 12 months.95
The Australian cannabis market is supplied almost wholly by domestically cultivated 
cannabis. With the exception of cannabis seeds, oil and resin, it is not profitable or 
necessary to import cannabis into Australia.  
 
 
93 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2014, World Drug Report 2014, UNODC, Vienna.
94 ibid.
95 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2014, National Drug Strategy Household Survey detailed report 2013, Drug 
Statistics Series no. 28, Cat. no. PHE 183, AIHW, Canberra.
CASE STUDY 
A$1.5 BILLION SEIZURE OF MDMA AND CRYSTAL 
METHYLAMPHETAMINE1
In late November 2014, members of the Joint Organised Crime Group (JOCG)2 arrested 
six men in relation to the seizure of illicit drugs estimated to be worth up to A$1.5 billion 
on the street. Almost 2 tonnes of MDMA and more than 800 kilograms of crystal 
methylamphetamine were hidden inside a mixed container-load of furniture and 
unmarked boxes shipped to Australia from Germany.
Police conducted a controlled delivery of the consignment to an address in Blacktown in 
Sydney, where its contents were removed and transported to another location. The six 
men were arrested when they were found accessing the boxes from the consignment at 
an address in Smithfield, also in Sydney.
1 Australian Crime Commission, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Australian Federal Police, New South 
Wales Crime Commission & New South Wales Police Force 2014, ‘Drugs worth $1.5 billion seized by Joint Organised 
Crime Group’, joint media release, 29 November 2014, viewed 9 December 2014, <https://crimecommission.gov.au/
media-centre/release/australian-crime-commission-joint-media-release/drugs-worth-15-billion-seized>.0
2 The JOCG comprises staff from the AFP, the NSW Police Force, the ACBPS, the NSW Crime Commission and the ACC.
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In 2013–14, the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service made 2,840 
detections of cannabis, weighing just 158.07 kilograms.96 The majority of the detections 
were of cannabis seeds.
Organised crime and other low- to medium-level criminal networks are well established 
in the Australian cannabis market, capitalising on the market’s profitability and 
strength, though the nature and extent of this involvement vary from state to state. 
There is considerable diversity in the size and sophistication of cannabis cultivation in 
Australia, from small-scale ‘personal use’ cultivation through to large, sophisticated, 
indoor hydroponic ‘grow houses’ and large outdoor cannabis crops. The cultivation 
methodology varies depending on the group involved and the location.
Organised Crime in Australia 2013 reported on the then increase in the availability of 
synthetic cannabinoids, which are often incorrectly marketed as ‘legal’ alternatives 
to cannabis. The popularity and availability of these products have continued to grow 
since then. The use of these products is discussed in the ‘Drug analogues and new 
psychoactive substances’ chapter of this report.
Illicit pharmaceuticals
The illicit pharmaceutical market in Australia includes the use of prescription 
pharmaceuticals in a way that is inconsistent with their intended use or directions, such 
as intentional misuse or overuse (also referred to as non-medical use), as well as the 
diversion of pharmaceuticals to the illicit market. Illicit pharmaceuticals may be used in 
conjunction with, or as an alternative to, illicit drugs. They may also be used to manage 
the effects of other drugs. A wide range of pharmaceuticals may be misused, including 
anti-depressants, anti-psychotics and stimulants, but the most commonly misused 
pharmaceuticals in Australia are opioid analgesics and benzodiazepines.
An international study by INTERPOL in 2014 identified two well-established organised 
crime groups, as well as outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs), as being involved in 
pharmaceutical crime,97 although this activity was limited in comparison with their 
involvement in other illicit drug and weapons trafficking.98 Aside from these three 
groups, INTERPOL found that well-established hierarchical groups were not generally 
involved in pharmaceutical crime, but that it tended to be dominated by:
  highly organised, yet generally informal, international affiliate networks selling 
medicines through illicit online pharmacies, and
  small groups, not yet well established, of between 3 and 10 members, involved in 
various aspects of pharmaceutical crime.99
96 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 2014, Annual Report 2013–14, ACBPS, Canberra.
97 Pharmaceutical crime was defined as ‘the manufacturing and distribution of counterfeit or falsified (spurious/fake/
falsely labelled) pharmaceuticals or medical devices, through licit and illicit supply chains, involving: theft, fraud, 
diversion, smuggling, illegal trade, money laundering, corruption’.
98 INTERPOL 2014, Pharmaceutical crime and organized criminal groups: an analysis of the involvement of organized 
criminal groups in pharmaceutical crime since 2008, INTERPOL Pharmaceutical Crime Sub-Directorate, Lyon.
99 ibid.
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In Europe and North America, organised crime groups, including the Hell’s Angels 
OMCG, have been associated with the manufacture and distribution of counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals, such as performance and image enhancing drugs.100 Elsewhere 
in Europe, organised crime groups have been involved in the robbing of trucks 
transporting pharmaceutical drugs.101 In Central and South America, there are clear 
signs of counterfeit production, with finished illicit medicines or raw materials for illicit 
production exported to other countries in the region.102
In Australia, the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme subsidises the cost of a broad range of 
medicine for most medical conditions, ensuring that Australians have affordable access 
to pharmaceutical medicines, particularly in comparison with some other regions in the 
world. As a result, there is little demand for potentially counterfeit illicit pharmaceuticals 
purchased online.
Within Australia, illicit pharmaceuticals can be obtained a number of ways, including by 
obtaining a legitimate prescription (and then misusing the drugs), by theft or forgery of 
prescriptions, by purchasing on the illicit market or through the Internet, by diversion 
from family or friends, or through ‘doctor shopping’ (visiting multiple doctors to obtain 
multiple prescriptions).103 Because of the relative ease with which pharmaceuticals can 
be obtained for non-medical use in Australia, there are few opportunities for organised 
criminal involvement. Although there are organised networks involved in the diversion 
and distribution of some pharmaceuticals, these tend to be networks of users who are 
on-selling for profit.
The 2013 National Drug Strategy Household Survey reported a significant increase in 
the non-medical use of pharmaceuticals, from 4.2 per cent in 2010 to 4.7 per cent in 
2013.104 Only cannabis recorded a higher proportion of recent use in the survey. Recent 
non-medical use of pharmaceuticals was highest for those aged in their 20s and 30s; 
however, people aged over 60 were the next highest group to report recent non-medical 
use.105 The Australian Crime Commission assesses that the illicit pharmaceuticals market 
has the potential to increase in threat in the medium term.
Opioid analgesics
Opioid analgesics (or narcotic analgesics) are derived from the opium poppy and act on 
the central nervous system in a similar manner. They are primarily prescribed for pain 
management or the treatment of heroin or other opioid addiction. Commonly misused 
opioid analgesics include codeine, morphine, oxycodone, fentanyl and methadone.
100 ibid.
101 ibid.
102 ibid.
103 Roxburgh, A, Ritter, A, Slade, T & Burns, L 2013, Trends in drug use and related harms in Australia, 2001 to 2013, 
National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
104 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2014, National Drug Strategy Household Survey detailed report 2013, Drug 
Statistics Series no. 28, Cat. no. PHE 183, AIHW, Canberra.
105 ibid.
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The misuse of opioid analgesics is relatively low in the general population. The 2013 
National Drug Strategy Household Survey found that just 0.2 per cent of the population 
reported recent non-medical use of methadone or buprenorphine, and 0.4 per cent 
reported recent use of ‘other opiates/opioids’.106 A larger proportion (3.3 per cent) 
reported recent non-medical use of painkillers/analgesics, although it should be noted 
that this category includes both prescription and non-prescription medications, such as 
ibuprofen and paracetamol.107
Opioid analgesics may be misused to supplement or as a substitute for heroin use. 
Results from the annual Illicit Drug Reporting System survey and the annual Australian 
Needle and Syringe Program Survey108 indicate that misuse of opioid analgesics tends to 
be higher in the Northern Territory and Tasmania, where heroin availability is lower than 
in other jurisdictions,109 as well as in some Indigenous communities.
Benzodiazepines
Benzodiazepines are minor tranquillisers that are commonly prescribed to relieve 
insomnia, anxiety and panic attacks. Benzodiazepines may be misused to manage the 
effects of stimulant drugs (such as methylamphetamine or cocaine), or as a substitute for 
or to enhance the effects of other depressant drugs.
Although there was a significant increase in the proportion of people reporting they had 
ever used ‘tranquillisers/sleeping pills’ for non-medical use in the 2013 National Drug 
Strategy Household Survey (up from 3.2 per cent in 2010 to 4.5 per cent in 2013), the 
proportion reporting recent use remained stable at 1.6 per cent (1.5 per cent in 2010).
Performance and image enhancing drugs
In recent years, the performance and image enhancing drugs (PIEDs) market in Australia 
appears to have grown rapidly, and now consists of users from an increasingly diverse 
demographic who are using an ever-widening range of substances. Peptides and human 
growth hormone have gained in popularity among PIEDs users, and are being used in 
combination with, and in addition to, anabolic steroids. One of the key drivers of the 
market is a strong youth culture, particularly prevalent among young males, that is 
focused on a muscular and athletic physical appearance.
The growth in the market appears to have led to an increase in individuals using needle 
and syringe programs to facilitate their injection of PIEDs. Results from the annual 
Australian Needle and Syringe Program Survey show a significant increase in respondents 
reporting PIEDs as the last drug they had injected, from 2 per cent in 2009 to 7 per cent in 
2013, with significant increases being reported in Queensland and New South Wales.110
106 ibid.
107 ibid.
108 Chow, S, Iverson, J & Maher, L 2014, Drug injection trends among participants in the Australian Needle and Syringe 
Program Survey, 2009–2013, Illicit Drug Reporting System Drug Trends Bulletin October supplement 2014, National 
Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
109 Stafford, J & Burns, L 2014, Australian drug trends 2013—findings from the Illicit Drug Reporting System, Australian 
Drug Trends Series no. 109, National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
110 Chow, S, Iverson, J &Maher, L 2014, Drug injection trends among participants in the Australian Needle and Syringe 
Program Survey, 2009–2013, Illicit Drug Reporting System Drug Trends Bulletin October supplement 2014, National 
Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
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The number of PIEDs detections at the Australian border has increased significantly, 
from fewer than 2,000 in 2008–09 to more than 10,000 in 2012–13.111 The number of 
detections then decreased in 2013–14 to 6,885.112 There is also evidence of the domestic 
diversion of chemicals used to produce injectable forms of steroids, suggesting possible 
domestic production of these substances, which may account for some of the decrease 
in border detections.
Internationally, organised crime groups are heavily involved in the trafficking of PIEDs. 
Organised crime groups, particularly outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs) and their 
associates, are involved in the trafficking of PIEDs in the Australian market. PIEDs are 
also regularly detected at premises where other illicit drugs are located. In January 2015, 
New South Wales Police and the National Anti-Gangs Squad charged an associate of the 
Comanchero OMCG in relation to three alleged importations of steroids from China.113
Anaesthetics
The two most commonly diverted anaesthetics for illicit use in Australia are ketamine 
hydrochloride (ketamine) and gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB), also known as ‘fantasy’. 
Both substances have well-established, albeit small, niche markets consisting of users 
primarily based in capital cities along the eastern seaboard.114 There are indications that 
drug users seeking alternatives to 3,4-methylenedioxymethylamphetamine (MDMA) may 
have turned to anaesthetics during periods of reduced MDMA availability.
Ketamine
Ketamine is most commonly legitimately used as a medical or veterinary anaesthetic, but 
is also used illicitly for its sedative and hallucinogenic effects. It is frequently detected as 
an adulterant in tablets sold as MDMA. The illicit market for ketamine is relatively stable, 
catering for a small niche group of users. Only 0.3 per cent of the population reported 
recent ketamine use in the 2013 National Drug Strategy Household Survey.115
Based on responses to the annual Ecstasy and Related Drugs Reporting System survey, 
ketamine use appears to be concentrated in Victoria and New South Wales. In 2014, 
18 per cent of the national sample reported using ketamine in the previous six months.116
In recent years, the proportion of Victorian respondents reporting recent ketamine use 
has increased significantly, from 20 per cent in 2008 to 63 per cent in 2014.117 Despite 
the reported increase in recent use in Victoria, ketamine use was infrequent, with 
a reported median of three days use in the preceding six months (compared with a 
111 Australian Crime Commission 2014, Illicit Drug Data Report 2012–13, ACC, Canberra.
112 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 2014, Annual Report 2013–14, ACBPS, Canberra.
113 New South Wales Police Force 2015, ‘Gangs Squad charge man over alleged steroid importation—Strike Force Raptor’, 
media release, 8 January 2015.
114 Sindicich, N & Burns, L 2014, An overview of the 2014 Ecstasy and Related Drugs Reporting System, EDRS Drug Trends 
Bulletin, October 2014, National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
115 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2014, National Drug Strategy Household Survey detailed report 2013, Drug 
Statistics Series no. 28, Cat. no. PHE 183, AIHW, Canberra.
116 National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre 2014, Australian drug trends 2014—findings from the EDRS (Drug Trends 
Conference handout), NDARC, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
117 ibid.
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median of two days nationally). It is unclear why the proportion of Victorian respondents 
reporting recent use has increased at a greater rate than in other jurisdictions; however, 
because of the small market and infrequency of use, this should not be taken as an 
indication of market expansion.
Organised crime has not been identified playing a key role in the ketamine market. 
Ketamine tends to be diverted or imported into the Australian illicit market in relatively 
small quantities, reflecting personal use or small-scale distribution rather than organised 
crime involvement.
GHB
GHB is a powerful central nervous system depressant that is readily manufactured 
from its precursors, gamma-butyrolactone (GBL) and 1,4-butanediol (1,4-BD). GBL and 
1,4-BD have legitimate uses as solvents in industrial chemical processes, including the 
production of polymers. If ingested, both GBL and 1,4-BD metabolise into GHB in the 
body. The effects of GHB vary greatly depending on the dose, and only a very small 
increase in dose can lead to overdose.
Like the ketamine market, the Australian GHB market remains stable, supplying a similar 
small niche group of users. Less than 0.1 per cent of the population reported recent GHB 
use in the 2013 National Drug Strategy Household Survey.118
As with the ketamine market, results from the Ecstasy and Related Drugs Reporting 
System survey indicate that GHB use is concentrated in New South Wales and Victoria, 
but at lower levels. In 2014, just 5 per cent of the national sample reported recent 
GHB use. Use appeared to be more frequent in Victoria, with a median of 10 days use 
in the previous six months, compared with a median of two days nationally. However, 
meaningful conclusions about the significance of this cannot be drawn because of the 
small size of the market.
Unlike the ketamine market, there are elements of organised crime present in the 
Australian GHB, GBL and 1,4-BD markets, with some transnational organised crime 
groups being implicated in suspected importations into Australia. Despite this, the level 
of sophistication required to operate in this market is quite low, given the ease with 
which GBL and 1,4-BD can be diverted from the legitimate market.
Tryptamines
Tryptamines are hallucinogenic substances that act on the central nervous system, 
distorting mood, thought and perception. In Australia the most commonly used 
tryptamines remain lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), psilocybin-containing mushrooms 
(magic mushrooms) and dimethyltryptamine (DMT). Recent years have seen the 
emergence of a range of hallucinogenic substances that mimic the effect of these 
substances, but these substances are regarded as drug analogues and new psychoactive 
substances (DANPS) and are discussed within the DANPS chapter of this report.
118 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2014, National Drug Strategy Household Survey detailed report 2013, Drug 
Statistics Series no. 28, Cat. no. PHE 183, AIHW, Canberra.
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The tryptamines market, like the anaesthetic market, is a small but complex niche 
market, making it difficult for law enforcement to obtain an accurate picture of its size 
and nature. According to the 2013 National Drug Strategy Household Survey, almost 
one in 10 Australians have used ‘hallucinogens’ in their lifetime, but only 1.3 per cent 
reported use in the previous 12 months.119
Results from the 2014 Ecstasy and Related Drugs Reporting System (EDRS) survey show 
that LSD use is relatively stable, with 41 per cent of the national sample reporting LSD 
use in the previous six months. Reported use was consistent across most jurisdictions, 
although the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) reported a significant drop in recent use, 
from 53 per cent in 2013 to 19 per cent in 2014. Despite this decrease, ACT respondents 
reported using LSD more frequently than in other jurisdictions, with a median of four 
days use in the previous six months, compared with two days use nationally.120
Although recent use of LSD remained stable, there was a significant decrease in reported 
recent use of psilocybin-containing mushrooms, from 27 per cent in 2013 to 21 per 
cent in 2014. Proportions of respondents reporting recent use were similar across all 
jurisdictions other than the Northern Territory, where it was much lower. Frequency of 
use was low nationally, with a median of two days use in the previous six months.121
Recent use of DMT by EDRS respondents remained stable at 14 per cent. The proportion 
of respondents reporting recent use varied across jurisdictions, from 30 per cent in 
Victoria to 8 per cent in the Northern Territory. DMT use was infrequent, with a national 
median of just one day’s use in the previous six months.
As with other niche drug markets, tryptamine users are active on social media, 
contributing to forums and websites to share experiences and source substances. 
Tryptamine use has long been associated with spiritual and/or religious rituals and 
regular users have forums dedicated to promoting it. LSD is predominantly self-sourced 
over the Internet or supplied by friends. Similarly, psilocybin-containing mushrooms are 
generally obtained for personal use or supplied in close circles, although there has been 
a recent prosecution for manufacture and supply of a commercial quantity. Given the 
nature of this market, which frequently includes experimentation with new chemicals for 
the manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants, the Internet will continue to have a 
role in both supplying and promoting tryptamine use.
Intellectual property crime
Intellectual property (IP) is the term used to describe ‘the application of the mind to 
develop something new or original’.122 IP crime is a generic term that describes three 
types of crime markets—counterfeit goods, piracy and the theft of trade secrets.
119 ibid.
120 National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre 2014, Australian drug trends 2014—findings from the EDRS (Drug Trends 
Conference handout), NDARC, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
121 ibid.
122 IP Australia, ‘What is IP?’, Department of Industry and Science, Canberra, viewed 16 January 2015, <http://www.
ipaustralia.gov.au/understanding-intellectual-property/what-is-ip/>.
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Counterfeit goods
Technology has a key role in facilitating IP crime, making it easier to produce counterfeit 
goods that appear almost identical to genuine ones. The Internet has made online selling 
and purchasing of these goods a common practice. One report identifies that: 
‘it is with the trends of globalisation, the integration of markets and the rise of the 
Internet economy in recent decades that violations of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
have become more widespread. Easy access to computers, the Internet and other 
technological developments facilitate the duplication of designs, labels, logos, packaging 
and documentation with speed, accuracy and relative anonymity’.123
Counterfeit goods continue to be imported into, and manufactured within, Australia, 
with the range of goods counterfeited continuing to expand in line with global trends.
Operations by international agencies give some idea of the global size of the market. 
INTERPOL conducted a one-month operation in parts of Eastern Europe in 2012 that 
resulted in the seizure of 7.3 million counterfeit goods.124 In the same year, the World 
Customs Organization stated that its members had reported nearly 980 separate brands 
being counterfeited. The three main product types counterfeited were accessories 
(15.8 per cent), clothing (14.8 per cent) and pharmaceutical products (10.2 per cent).125
In Australia in April 2013, the Commonwealth Intellectual Property Laws Amendment 
(Raising the Bar) Act 2012 came into effect. The amendments strengthen processes for 
seizure of counterfeit goods and allow the Australian Customs and Border Protection 
Service (ACBPS) to release more information to the rights holder for the genuine 
goods. This includes details of importers, exporters and others in the supply chain 
suspected of importing the goods. Such information was not immediately available to 
rights holders previously and should give increased scope for legal action. Additionally, 
importers of seized goods now have to make a claim for return of their goods, including 
providing information to enable the rights owner to locate the importer and initiate 
legal proceedings for the infringement. This closed a previous loophole that enabled 
importers of counterfeit or pirated goods to avoid prosecution and still retain the goods. 
Since this strengthened legislation was introduced, 99.9 per cent of seized goods 
suspected to be counterfeit have been forfeited; before these legislative amendments, 
only 25 per cent of the seized goods suspected to be counterfeit were forfeited.126
The ACBPS continues to make large seizures of counterfeit goods at the border (see the 
case study on page 54). In 2013–14, it made 3,427 separate seizures totalling just less 
than one million items.127 In 2012–13 there were 2,572 seizures totalling 513,814 items, 
which demonstrates a significant increase in the seizures of counterfeit goods.128
123 Hoorens, S, Hunt, P, Malchiodi, A, Liccardo Pacula, R, Kadiyala, S, Rabinovich, L & Irving, B 2012, Measuring IPR 
infringements in the internal market: development of a new approach to estimating the impact of infringements on 
sales, RAND Corporation, Cambridge, p. vii.
124 Newton, J 2013, ‘Introduction: Trafficking in illicit goods—an inclusive INTERPOL programme to combat all types of 
illicit trade’, in Anti-counterfeiting 2013—a global guide, INTERPOL, Lyon, p. 22.
125 World Customs Organization 2013, Illicit Trade Report 2012, WCO, Brussels, June 2013, p. 87.
126 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 2014, Annual Report 2013–14, ACBPS, Canberra.
127 Hall, M 2014, ‘Nano tracer aims to consign fake goods to the reject pile’, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 December 2014, 
viewed 8 December 2014, <http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/business-it/nano-tracer-aims-to-consign-fake-goods-to-
the-reject-pile-20141201-11xhh5.html>.
128 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 2014, Annual Report 2013–14, ACBPS, Canberra.
54
ORGANISED CRIME IN AUSTRALIA 2015 
AUSTRALIAN CRIME COMMISSION
ORGANISED CRIME IN AUSTRALIA 2015 
AUSTRALIAN CRIME COMMISSION
Most counterfeit goods seized at mail centres are of unknown origin and are suspected 
of being ordered online. As Internet and online trading can provide greater levels of 
anonymity, it is not known if those providing the counterfeit goods are organised crime 
groups or other criminal entities.
Despite the majority of Australian seizures being small and at mail centres, the size 
of sea cargo seizures, the diversity of goods counterfeited and the sophistication of 
deception methodologies suggest that organised crime is involved in the importation of 
counterfeit goods to Australia.
CASE STUDY 
LARGE SEIZURE OF COUNTERFEIT GOODS
The World Customs Organization and INTERPOL coordinate an annual international week 
of action under Operation Pangea, targeting organised crime involvement in the trade in 
counterfeit and illegal medicines purchased over the Internet. This year, ACBPS officers 
seized 51 packages containing over 21,000 units of counterfeit or illegal medicines at the 
Sydney and Melbourne international mail centres, after they had been posted from a 
range of overseas countries.1 For the 113 countries participating in this week of action, 
INTERPOL reported that 434 arrests were made worldwide and suspected counterfeit 
medicines worth more than US$36 million were seized.2
1 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 2014, ‘ACBPS and TGA contribute to worldwide crackdown on 
counterfeit and illegal medicines’, media release, 25 May 2014, viewed 8 December 2014, <newsroom.customs.gov.
au/channels/Seizures-cargo-and-mail/releases/acbps-and-tga-contribute-to-worldwide-crackdown-on-counterfeit-
and-illegal-medicines>.
2 INTERPOL, ‘Operations’, viewed 8 December 2014, <http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Pharmaceutical-crime/
Operations/Operation-Pangea>.
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Piracy
Reporting of organised crime involvement in the piracy of film, music, television and 
computer software continues internationally. Technology continues to make such piracy 
easier to conduct. For example, an industry study129 identified that online film and 
television piracy is increasing and that 29 per cent of Australian adults aged 18–64 have 
engaged in online piracy. It was noted that 24 per cent of 12–17-year-olds in Australia 
admitted using illegal websites to access pirated content, but this peaked with the 18–24 
age group, where 54 per cent were engaging in online piracy. Nevertheless, it was also 
reported that 60 per cent of adults aged 18–64 had never downloaded unauthorised 
television or movie content online.130
It remains likely that organised crime involvement in piracy of these products should 
decrease as consumers increasingly download them illegally from the Internet without 
paying. Already some law enforcement agencies have reported that the decrease in the 
number of detections of pirated copies of music, films, television programs and software 
has been greater than that observed for other unauthorised goods.
Although the piracy of music, film and television may be becoming less attractive to 
organised crime, industry reporting suggests that the pirated software market is still 
profitable. The Business Software Alliance estimates that the commercial value of pirated 
software increased from US$58.8 billion in 2010 to US$62.7 billion in 2013. The Business 
Software Alliance also calculated that, in 2013, Australia had a software piracy rate of 
21 per cent, which is below the global rate of 43 per cent.131
Trade secrets
Trade secrets provide a distinct business and economic advantage to the holder, and 
this makes them an attractive target for theft or misappropriation by corporations and 
governments. Trade secrets are valuable because they give some form of competitive 
advantage; with this in mind, some businesses do not apply for patents because they 
know that doing so makes their knowledge or processes public.
Theft of trade secrets is increasing as a concern globally. The real nature and scope of 
the problem from an Australian perspective is difficult to quantify, as victim companies 
remain reluctant to report such thefts.
129 Intellectual Property Awareness Foundation 2013, ‘New research: the first in-depth study on Australian teens and 
film and TV piracy—piracy not the ‘social norm’ in this age group, but almost 1 in 4 teens are active pirates’, media 
release, 30 September 2013, viewed 15 January 2015, <http://www.ipawareness.com.au/research/2014>; Bodey, M 
2014, ‘Australians who download illegally doing it more often’, Australian, 15 October 2014, viewed 5 March 2015, 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/media/australians-who-download-illegally-doing-it-more-often/story-
e6frg996-1227091652438>.
130 Intellectual Property Awareness Foundation 2014, 2014 research: online behaviour and attitudes of Australians to 
movie and TV piracy, viewed 9 December 2014, <http://www.ipawareness.com.au/research/2014>.
131 Business Software Alliance 2014, BSA Global Software Survey—in brief, The Software Alliance, June 2014, viewed 22 
January 2015, <http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2013/downloads/studies/2013GlobalSurvey_InBrief_a4.pdf>.
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In early 2013, the Director-General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
(ASIO) was quoted as saying: ‘Electronic intelligence gathering is being used against 
Australia on a massive scale to extract confidential information from governments, the 
private sector and ordinary individuals. It is used to steal intellectual property, all kinds 
of defence secrets, weapon designs and commercially advantageous information.’132 The 
media article in which the Director-General of ASIO was quoted also notes the Deputy 
Director of the then Defence Signals Directorate stating that at least 65 per cent of cyber 
intrusions have an economic focus.
Although theft of trade secrets is not new, current international economic volatility and the 
ongoing process of globalisation are likely to be key drivers in the expansion of this crime 
market. As Australia is an advanced economy increasingly reliant on knowledge-based 
industries, it is also likely that domestic businesses may be targeted as part of that expansion.
Intellectual property will increase in value as advanced economies transform, with the 
result that knowledge and ideas will become more tradeable as commodities. This 
development will see corporations and serious and organised crime groups continue to 
try to access and misappropriate intellectual property. The harm caused in these new 
economies could therefore become larger than is presently the case.
The economic costs resulting from IP crime include significant economic consequences 
through a loss of revenue and the need to invest resources to anticipate and prevent 
such crime. The loss of confidence in markets and brands has economic implications for 
producers and investors. International relationships and national security have also been 
affected by IP-related criminal activity.
Firearm trafficking
For this report, the criminal trafficking of firearms is defined as the movement of illegally 
owned, modified or manufactured firearms between market suppliers and organised 
crime. In Australia, there is no single group that dominates the sale and supply of 
firearms to the illicit market. Both organised crime groups and individual, lower-level 
criminals drive the demand for illicit firearms. Firearm enthusiasts with no previous 
criminal involvements can also influence demand by sourcing rare or specialised items 
from the illicit market because they cannot obtain these items through licit means.
Although there are direct links between firearm trafficking and other serious crimes—for 
example, the use of illegally obtained firearms in drive-by shootings—this section deals 
specifically with the issue of trafficking.
Organised crime will continue to acquire and use firearms as an enabler for their area of 
criminal business, whether it is to protect their interests or to commit acts of violence. 
Firearms—particularly short-arms—are more likely to be circulated between crime 
group members so that they can be used for intimidation and threats against rival groups 
and individuals; to protect their area of criminal operation; and for use in inter-gang or 
individual conflicts that stem from disputes in other criminal activities such as extortion, 
outstanding debts and drug repayments. Concealable firearms are also highly sought 
after by criminals for their portability.
132 Loye, C 2013, ‘It’s global cyber war out there’, Australian Financial Review, 2 January 2013.
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The ‘grey market’ and technical loopholes in legislation continue as historical methods of 
supplying and diverting firearms to the illicit market. Contemporary methods of supply 
include theft from licensed individuals and firearm dealers, or the illegal importation of 
firearms and parts.
The grey market is part of the illicit market and comprises primarily long-arms that 
were not registered or surrendered in accordance with the 1996 National Firearms 
Agreement. The grey market is the main source of rifles and shotguns in the illicit 
market; however, the majority of grey market firearms are believed to be held by ‘non-
criminals’. The large pool of long-arms in the grey market, and motivation by criminal 
entities to obtain firearms, make this a continuing source of supply.
There are also a very small number of individuals who domestically manufacture limited 
quantities of firearms—in particular, single-shot and sub-machine guns. In Australia, the 
illicit manufacture of small-calibre single-shot pen guns is a confirmed concern to law 
enforcement as they are reliable, concealable and effective in firing ammunition.
Recent years have seen the emergence of new threats in the illicit firearms supply to 
the market. Advances in technology have enabled an online black market for firearms 
and firearm parts, and ongoing developments in three-dimensional (3D) printing and 
computer-controlled milling have facilitated the creation of operative firearms.
Online purchasing of illicit firearms remains a threat. Peer-to-peer websites, such as 
Black Market Revisited and Agora, have enabled the trade in illicit firearms to operate 
freely, affording anonymity and offering secure online payment systems. Globally, law 
enforcement has been successful in shutting down darknet websites such as Silk Road; 
however, other darknet sites are quickly created to fill any void. Before being shut down, 
Silk Road had closed its site ‘The Armoury’—a website specifically designed to facilitate 
the trading of firearms, their components and ammunition.
3D printers and milling machines provide those seeking to do so with the capability to 
successfully create a functional firearm and/or parts. Digital mills are capable of carving 
firearm frames from aluminium. These frames—with no identifying serial numbers— 
have the potential to be produced for the illicit market. Currently, 3D-printed firearms 
may be of low quality, unreliable and expensive to produce; however, recent seizures 
of 3D-printed firearm parts demonstrate that software and hardware advances and 
decreased manufacturing costs may make 3D printing of firearms or firearm parts an 
increasingly viable option in the future.133 Accordingly, organised crime can be expected 
to adapt its uptake in line with improvements in these products.
The extent to which firearms and firearm parts are illegally imported into Australia, and 
are not detected at the border, is currently unknown. Historical trace data has shown 
proportionally low levels of importation when compared with other known methods of 
diversion. Increased use of the Internet and darknet websites, however, is likely to drive 
an increase in firearm importation, and pose a threat to border security (see the case 
study on page 58).
133 Australian Crime Commission 2014, ‘ACC submission to the inquiry into the ability of Australian law enforcement 
authorities to eliminate gun-related violence in the community’, ACC, Canberra.
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The social impacts of firearm trafficking are diverse and include the targeting of legitimate 
firearm owners and dealers for theft. Some Australian policing jurisdictions saw an increase 
in the number of registered firearms stolen within their regions in 2013–14.
The Australian Government is aiming to develop a National Firearms Interface (NFI) by 
2015, which will track the full life of a firearm, a capacity previously unavailable to law 
enforcement agencies. This will be achieved through a single shared record for each 
firearm and for each firearm licensed holder. The NFI allows input of events against 
a firearm nationally, with visibility of all movements from the time of importation or 
legal domestic manufacture, including information on status changes, criminal activity, 
destruction or exportation, thus providing a greater insight into the movement of a firearm.
In February 2015, the Australian Government passed the Crimes Legislation Amendment 
(Psychoactive Substances and Other Measures) Bill 2014 to introduce international 
firearms trafficking offences and implement mandatory minimum sentences of five 
years imprisonment for illegal firearms trafficking. The proposed laws extend the existing 
offences for cross-border disposal or acquisition of firearms.
CASE STUDY 
DARKNET IMPORTATION OF AN ILLICIT 
FIREARM1
In December 2013, a Victorian man was convicted of importing a semi-automatic hand 
gun and possessing ammunition, after the firearm and ammunition magazine were 
purchased from the darknet website Black Market Reloaded and imported into Australia 
from the United States, concealed in a karaoke machine.
Although it is not an offence to access darknet websites such as these, it is illegal to import 
controlled firearms into Australia that have been purchased from these darknet sites.
1 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 2013, ‘Stay out of the firing line of online black markets’, ACBPS 
Newsroom, 14 December 2013, viewed 12 February 2015, <http://newsroom.customs.gov.au/channels/Firearms-and-
weapons/releases/stay-out-of-the-firing-line-of-online-black-markets>.
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High-profile firearm incidents will continue to elevate firearm-related violence to the 
forefront of public awareness, media headlines and political agendas. The systemic 
impact of firearm trafficking can include significant government expenditure, and 
notably legislative change and law enforcement and border protection responses, in an 
attempt to counter firearm trafficking.
Environmental crime
Australia is a biodiversity haven with pristine natural resources and endangered  
wildlife. Any organised crime exploitation of the Australian environment is therefore  
a significant threat.
As with most other crimes, the illicit nature of environmental crime, including the way 
in which those involved in this market try to commingle legal and illegal commodities 
and trade, makes it difficult to measure both the extent of environmental crime and the 
scope of organised criminal involvement in it.
Environmental crime can include:
  illegal trade in wildlife
  illegal harvesting of and trade in timber and other forest products
  pollution caused by the dumping of hazardous waste, illegal discharge and e-waste
  illegal trade in ozone-depleting substances
  illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing.
The diverse environmental crime market is often transnational in nature, with 
international and national environmental experts claiming that it is one of the most 
profitable and fastest-growing criminal markets.134 For example, in 2013 Europol 
assessed that 1 kilogram of rhino horn was valued at between €37,000 and €46,000, 
which was nearly twice the price of gold.135
Estimates of the value of the global environmental crime market vary widely. For 
example, the United Nations Environment Programme estimates that organised crime 
syndicates earn between US$20 billion and US$30 billion from environmental crime.136 
However, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development—while 
acknowledging the difficulty of quantifying this crime market—estimates the global value 
to be around US$30–70 billion. The true value of this crime market is unknown.
134 Skinnider, E 2011, Victims of environmental crime—mapping the issues, International Centre for Criminal Law Reform 
and Criminal Justice Policy, Vancouver; Bricknell, S 2010, Environmental crime in Australia, Australian Institute of 
Criminology, Canberra; United Nations Environment Programme 2003, New initiative to combat growing global 
menace of environmental crime, 2 June 2003, viewed August 2013, <http://_www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/
Default.asp?DocumentID=321&ArticleID=4017>.
135 Europol 2013, SOCTA 2013, Europol, The Hague, p. 57.
136 Walters, R 2013, ‘Eco mafia and environmental crime’, in Carrington, K, Ball, MJ, O’Brien, E & Tauri, JM (eds), Crime, 
justice and social democracy, Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp. 281–94.
60
ORGANISED CRIME IN AUSTRALIA 2015 
AUSTRALIAN CRIME COMMISSION
ORGANISED CRIME IN AUSTRALIA 2015 
AUSTRALIAN CRIME COMMISSION
A wide variety of actors commit environmental crime, ranging from opportunistic 
individuals through to sophisticated, well-organised crime groups and corporations. For 
example, the Australian illicit wildlife market is consistent with international markets 
and is based on opportunistic activity as well as complex networks involving suppliers, 
poachers, couriers, collectors and entrenched criminal syndicates.
Wildlife
The illegal wildlife trade in Australia is assessed as a small, niche transnational market. 
Organised crime groups are attracted to the profits to be made from illegal trade in 
wildlife, and are most likely to be involved in the high-value transactions.
A limited domestic market, coupled with high international demand for Australian native 
wildlife, suggests that Australia may be vulnerable to exploitation by both overseas and 
Australia-based criminal entities seeking to capitalise on this demand.
As well, the Internet is now a key enabler of illegal trade in wildlife, providing an 
unregulated and anonymous marketplace that introduces suppliers and collectors from 
around the world.
Illegal logging
Australia has been a destination country for illegal timber and this remains the case. New 
legislation passed in 2012 is designed to promote the trade in legally harvested timber 
and timber products. The Illegal Logging Prohibition Act 2012 (Cwlth) aims to reduce 
the harmful environmental, social and economic impacts of illegal logging. It is now a 
criminal offence to import illegally logged timber and timber products into Australia, or 
to process Australian raw logs that have been harvested illegally.
Hazardous waste
Hazardous waste includes any waste material that is toxic, flammable, corrosive, explosive, 
infectious or poisonous. Increasingly restrictive regulatory regimes relating to hazardous 
waste are raising the cost of compliance, providing an opportunity for organised crime to 
offer low-cost waste disposal solutions to legitimate businesses. This waste is subsequently 
disposed of illegally by the organised crime groups that provide the service.
Europol has identified both organised crime groups and legitimate businesses involved in 
the illegal trading of hazardous waste, with some of sufficient size and power to be ‘able 
to participate in large-scale illegal waste management and trafficking activities including 
manipulating tender processes and disposing of multi-ton amounts of waste’.137
Australia is reported to be one of the highest users of technology, making it a source 
country of e-waste production and vulnerable to illegal domestic dumping of e-waste.138 
It is likely that Australia will continue to be an exporter of hazardous waste, and e-waste 
in particular. This, combined with rising regulatory compliance costs, may lead to 
increased criminal activity in this market.
137 Europol 2013, Threat Assessment 2013, Europol, The Hague, November 2013, p. 10.
138 Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013, ‘Waste generated per person’, from Measures of Australia’s Progress 2010: is 
life in Australia getting better?, ABS, Canberra, viewed 12 March 2015, <http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/
Lookup/by%20Subject/1370.0~2010~Chapter~Waste%20per%20person%20(6.6.3)>.
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Ozone-depleting substances
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is the global protocol 
that sets out a mandatory timetable for the phasing out of ozone-depleting substances. 
Ratified by 196 countries, the Montreal Protocol sets binding progressive phase-out 
obligations for developed and developing countries for all the major ozone-depleting 
substances, including chlorofluorocarbons, halons and less damaging transitional 
chemicals such as hydrochlorofluorocarbons. According to the protocol, all ozone-
depleting substances are to be phased out by 2030.
It is unclear if there is an illicit ozone-depleting substances market in Australia. However, 
globally, an illegal trade in ozone-depleting substances has been observed since the 
Montreal Protocol came into being. A recent United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) assessment139 noted that the Montreal Protocol had created conditions for 
an ozone-depleting substances black market, and that the trade exhibited evidence of 
transnational criminal networks spanning different continents and nationalities.
Illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing
IUU fishing refers to fishing that does not comply with national, regional or global 
fisheries conservation and management obligations. IUU fishing occurs in Australian 
waters when either domestic or foreign fishing vessels contravene Australian fishing 
laws and regulations. Deterrents, including surface and air surveillance, together with a 
national commitment to pursue infringements, will probably continue to keep this illegal 
activity at a low level.
Internationally, law enforcement agencies are increasingly acknowledging the 
significance of transnational environmental crime (including the resultant harms), as 
well as the involvement of organised crime. The UNODC, Europol and INTERPOL have 
all initiated projects, resolutions or threat assessments to address environmental crime. 
For example, since late 2011, INTERPOL has developed five projects covering different 
elements of environmental crime. Two of these projects—Project Eden, targeting the 
illegal trading and disposal of waste, and Project Scale, which aims to detect, suppress 
and combat fisheries crime—were initiated in 2013. The European Union Serious and 
Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2013 also identified environmental crime as one of 
the emerging threats requiring intensified monitoring.
The direct harm from environmental crime is damage to the environment and wildlife. 
Environmental crime damages the environment by polluting and depleting natural 
resources and by compromising the survival of native and introduced flora and fauna. 
Environmental harm also damages the health of communities and individuals and has 
a detrimental effect on stability of the labour market in tourism, environment and 
sustainable industries.
139 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2013, Transnational organized crime in East Asia and the Pacific: a threat 
assessment, UNODC, Vienna, April 2013.
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CRIMES IN THE MAINSTREAM 
ECONOMY
Card fraud
Card fraud is defined as the fraudulent acquisition and/or use of debit and credit cards, 
or card details, for financial gain.
Card fraud may involve:
  application fraud—the acquisition of legitimate cards from financial institutions by 
using false supporting documentation
  card theft or card-not-received fraud—the theft of legitimate credit and debit cards 
before the designated customers receive them
  card-not-present fraud—the use of acquired card details to make purchases over the 
phone or Internet, so the card does not need to be physically presented
  card skimming—the illegal copying of card details from a card’s magnetic stripe at 
automatic teller machines (ATMs) or at point of sale, which can then be used to 
create counterfeit cards
  the creation and use of counterfeit cards—the production and use of fake 
credit cards, with card details skimmed or acquired from the legitimate cards of 
unsuspecting victims
  phishing—the acquisition of customer card or account details through deceptive 
emails aimed at tricking the customer into providing information to enable illegal 
account access
  hacking—the acquisition of personal and account details by gaining illegal access to 
company databases to steal customer financial data.
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The card fraud market continues to be dominated by overseas-based groups. Many 
groups are based overseas and travel to Australia to conduct specific card fraud 
offences—for example, conducting shopping trips with fraudulent cards or skimming 
ATMs for card details.
Card-not-present fraud
The incidence of card-not-present fraud continues to rise, and it is the most prominent 
form of card fraud, reportedly accounting for 72 per cent of all card frauds in Australia in 
2013. The Australian Payments Clearing Association (APCA) reported a rise in card-not-
present fraud on Australian cards in the 2013–14 financial year, from A$199.2 million to 
A$256.1 million. Sixty-six per cent of this fraud on Australian cards occurred overseas.
Over the four years until December 2013, there was a 67 per cent increase in card-not-
present fraud, which may be in parallel with the 140 per cent growth in online shopping 
over the same period.140
Skimming
APCA reports that counterfeit/skimming fraud has increased from A$37.0 million to 
A$42.0 million over the 12 months to June 2014. However, this is still much lower than 
the peak of A$66.0 million in 2011. This increase is reported to be influenced by the rise 
in the incidence of ATM skimming over the period.141
Lost/stolen card fraud
APCA has also reported that lost and stolen card fraud on Australian cards increased 
from A$30.5 million to A$33.1 million over the 2013–14 financial year. The majority of 
this increase is attributable to fraud taking place on Australian cards used in overseas 
banking systems; however, fraud occurring on Australian cards used within the Australian 
banking system has decreased.142
Australia is one of the countries leading the adoption of contactless payments. The 
system was introduced as recently as 2007, but there are now about 100 million 
contactless payments on credit/debit cards every month. The rapid uptake of contactless 
payments in Australia is likely to attract serious and organised crime groups involved in 
card fraud. Contactless payments are more secure than magnetic stripe card technology, 
which remains an easy and lucrative way to facilitate serious and organised card fraud. 
However, with the gradual phasing out of magnetic stripe technology, the exploitation of 
contactless payments will become more attractive to serious and organised crime.
140 Australian Payments Clearing Association 2014, ‘Payments fraud trends a reminder to take care when Christmas 
shopping online’, media release, 9 December 2014, viewed 8 January 2015, <http://apca.com.au/docs/2014-media-
releases/Payments-fraud-trends-a-reminder-to-take-care-when-Christmas-shopping-online.pdf>.
141 ibid.
142 ibid.
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Mail theft
In the past two years, the incidence of theft of cards from the mail has increased, with 
a particular increase observed since early 2013. It is possible that improved security 
measures such as card chip and personal identification number (PIN) security have led 
less-sophisticated criminal entities to revert to stealing genuine cards. The introduction 
of contactless payment cards may also have led to an increase in less-sophisticated 
criminals stealing cards from the mail. The ability to use these cards to purchase goods 
without having to provide a PIN or signature leaves them susceptible to small-scale card 
fraud, as transaction and daily amount limits reduce the potential for large-scale fraud.
Technology
Technology is a significant enabler of card fraud, facilitating both the theft of details 
and the sale of fake cards and personal information. Advances in technology continue 
to influence how card fraud is conducted. The ability of organised crime to hack into 
corporate datasets and steal banking details remains a key threat. As the amount of 
personal information placed or stored online increases, this threat is likely to increase.
Darknets continue to facilitate card fraud. One site identified by law enforcement in 
Australia was selling cards for 8 cents, card code verifications (CCVs) for $8, and other 
card details, including billing addresses, for $80. At one point, 14,000 users were known 
to be accessing the site.
Technology-based improvements in ATM, EFTPOS and card security will also continue 
to influence card fraud methodologies used by serious and organised crime groups. 
As technology continues to enhance security features, organised crime will develop 
countermeasures. Organised crime groups that remain involved in card skimming are 
displaying increased sophistication in their methodologies. For example, they are now 
installing skimming devices within ATMs that are not detectable by either the customer 
or the ATM owner. Criminal groups are also targeting specific service industries to 
compromise card data.
The use of Internet-capable mobile devices to conduct financial transactions has 
increased over recent years and will continue to increase. This increased use, combined 
with expanded device functions, such as the capability to conduct Internet banking and 
other online transactions, is likely to be exploited by organised crime.
Although APCA has assessed that the card fraud rate in Australia was one-third less than 
that of the United Kingdom in 2013,143 assessments of the size of the card fraud market 
based on reported card fraud figures are likely to underestimate the market size. Individuals 
who have been the victim of card fraud report that fraud to their financial institution rather 
than to police, and these financial institutions are reluctant to provide details of their full 
exposure to card fraud. Independent surveys may present a more accurate assessment. In 
one survey conducted in late 2012, 31 per cent of Australian respondents indicated that 
they had been a victim of card fraud in the previous five years.144
143 ibid.
144 Inscoe, SW 2012, Global consumers react to rising fraud: beware back of wallet, Aite Group LLC, Boston.
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Though individuals can be inconvenienced financially by card fraud, more enduring 
harm may be caused to personal credit ratings, identity and privacy. This may extend to 
emotional stress and fears for personal safety.
Card fraud, while harming the banking sector in the first instance, ultimately harms bank 
customers to whom the losses associated with card fraud are passed on as increased 
costs for banking services. Card fraud also damages commercial reputations and can 
disrupt business operations when payment facilities or information technology systems 
are compromised, particularly by skimming or hacking. Furthermore, card fraud can 
increase business costs and make the allocation of resources more complex or more 
burdensome for a business when it seeks to balance the uptake of anti-fraud practices 
against other operational priorities.
Revenue and taxation fraud
Revenue and taxation fraud involves the intentional and dishonest evasion of taxation 
obligations. The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) is responsible for the administration 
of tax products, which include income tax, goods and services tax (GST) and excise. 
Revenue and taxation fraud has the potential to reduce revenue collected and refunds 
paid, undermine self-assessment and voluntary compliance, which underpins the 
taxation system, and affect public confidence in the integrity of tax administration.
Organised crime entities exploiting the Australian taxation system are increasingly 
using complex and sophisticated organisational structures, making these entities less 
recognisable and harder to detect. There are four main ways in which organised crime 
perpetrates revenue and taxation fraud in Australia:
  tax refund fraud
  tax evasion schemes
  phoenixing schemes
  abusive use of trust structures.
There is clear evidence of the involvement of organised crime groups in the commission 
of tax refund fraud, including the emergence of transnational elements.
Examples of identified organised crime involvement in fraud on the taxation system are:
  large-scale property development projects involving multiple GST-registered businesses 
conspiring together to defraud the GST system through a series of false invoices
  exerting influence over tax agents and illegally accessing tax agent systems and 
information to perpetrate fraud
  attacks through the tax agent portal
  an increase in the theft of information from tax agents and employers (as reported to 
the ATO by those affected), where this information can be used for Business Activity 
Statement refund fraud and false payment summaries used for income tax fraud
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  the provision of labour hire services to industries using invalid contractor 
arrangements and unsubstantiated or exaggerated claims to avoid tax and other 
employer obligations, coupled with phoenix-like tactics in an attempt to avoid 
compliance action
  the lodging of false or fraudulent tax refund claims.
Refund fraud is very frequently enabled by identity crime. In particular, organised crime 
groups involved in revenue and taxation fraud have been lodging false returns that use 
the identities of those who have entered Australia on short-term visas.
Organised crime groups continually adapt their business models to explore low risk, high 
profit opportunities, including the use of sophisticated information technology expertise 
to perpetrate extensive attacks on information contained in government systems. These 
sorts of cyber attacks are aimed at harvesting taxpayer details such as tax file numbers 
and Australian Business Numbers, or at gaining illicit access to tax agent portals to 
perpetrate taxation fraud.
Professional facilitators working on behalf of organised crime remain a risk, with criminally 
complicit tax agents who engage in taxation fraud able to cause particular harm because of 
their expert knowledge of the taxation system, the taxation information they possess, and 
the level of access that they have to online services provided by the ATO.
Offshore tax evasion and fraud arrangements are becoming more complex, involving 
multiple layers of entities, havens and funds flows (see the case study on page 67). These 
arrangements are intended to illegally reduce taxable income, increase tax deductions 
against income, or avoid tax entirely. Professional facilitators, such as accountants and 
solicitors, are particularly valuable to organised crime and high-net-worth individuals in 
implementing these schemes.
Fraudulent phoenix activity also threatens the integrity of the tax revenue and 
superannuation systems. Phoenix fraud occurs when a company is intentionally placed 
into administration or liquidation to avoid payment of taxes and superannuation 
guarantee and/or other employee entitlements. A new company is then created to 
carry on the same or a similar business, typically with the same ownership. Fraudulent 
phoenixing activities deprive the community of necessary funds for essential services, 
and provide phoenix operators with an unfair competitive advantage over businesses 
operating legitimately in the same sector and meeting their tax and employee 
entitlement obligations.
The ATO reports that many of the individuals associated with fraudulent phoenix 
companies are known to be, or are suspected of being, criminals and/or are associated 
with criminal organisations spanning state, territory and sometimes national boundaries.
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Abusive trust fund schemes continue to be used by organised crime to hide criminal 
wealth, with the key advantage of trusts being their lack of transparency to regulators, 
allowing the beneficial owners of the funds in trusts to remain anonymous.
The harm from revenue and taxation fraud can be measured in the amount of tax 
dollars forgone to national revenue collection. Although this makes the government the 
ostensible victim of revenue and taxation fraud, revenue and taxation fraud affects the 
entire Australian community, reducing the tax revenue available to provide government-
funded public services, including infrastructure, transport, health services and education.
The tangible harms of revenue and taxation fraud are therefore measured less in dollars 
and more in the level of resources ultimately available to support societal wellbeing and 
social organisation.
CASE STUDY 
USE OF OFFSHORE ENTITIES TO EVADE TAX 
FROM THE SALE OF AUSTRALIAN STOCK 
EXCHANGE (ASX)-LISTED SHARES
Australian taxpayers who were clients of a well-known promoter used the services 
of an offshore service provider (OSP) located in Samoa to create controlled entities 
in jurisdictions such as Samoa, the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, 
Singapore, Switzerland, Ireland and the United Kingdom in an attempt to obfuscate 
residency status, and to create layers between share trading profits and beneficial 
ownership. The promoter used the services of Samoan entities, including a private bank 
and a trust, to establish entities on behalf of clients in these jurisdictions.
These entities provided nominee shareholders and directors to conceal true ownership 
and traded on the ASX on behalf of their nominees. Funds were often ‘parked’ overseas 
in the guise of insurance products, using the services of an offshore insurance company. 
When funds were repatriated, it was in the guise of loans, which were also used to 
generate false deductions for interest expenses. Loan draw-downs equalled the amount 
of interest payable.
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Illegal tobacco
Organised crime remains entrenched within the illegal tobacco market in Australia. It 
continues to perceive involvement in this market as a low risk, high profit enterprise.
The illegal tobacco market in Australia is supplied almost entirely by overseas-sourced 
product. Tobacco being smuggled into Australia to supply the illegal tobacco market 
comes in three forms:
  unbranded (‘chop chop’)—illicit tobacco sold as loose leaf or in tubes
  counterfeit—a copy of a particular product, carrying a trademark without the 
permission of the trademark owner, and sold for a price much lower than the legal 
product
  contraband—any cigarettes, counterfeit or legal, imported illegally and sold without 
the payment of applicable duties.
Included in the category of contraband are ‘cheap whites’, also known as ‘illicit whites’. 
These are cigarettes that have been produced legally in a factory with the approval 
of a licensing authority in an overseas jurisdiction, but that do not meet the product 
standards required in the jurisdiction in which they are eventually sold. Legitimate 
tobacco companies operating in the legal tobacco market in Australia have claimed 
that ‘illicit whites’ are a rapidly growing feature of the illegal tobacco market, with the 
Manchester brand the largest illicit white brand in Australia.
All of the three forms of tobacco product, when smuggled into Australia without duty 
being paid, are illegal. Organised crime seeks to make a significant profit from the 
importation of both genuine and counterfeit product.
Sea cargo has traditionally been the primary importation method (see the case study 
on page 69). In 2013–14, there was an increase of almost 7 per cent in the number of 
detections of illegal tobacco through this stream. However, the equivalent in total weight 
of tobacco seized from sea cargo had decreased by about 14 per cent: 296 tonnes in 
2013–14, down from 343 tonnes in 2012–13. At the same time, there was a significant 
increase in the number of detections of undeclared cigarettes through the international 
mail and air cargo streams. The decrease in the total weight of detections in sea 
cargo during this period indicates a shift in smuggling methodology, where there is a 
corresponding increase in detections through the air and postal streams of smaller, more 
frequent shipments.145 There are indications that those groups involved in the market 
are highly networked and that they have made significant effort to gain a knowledge of 
Customs procedures, priorities and detection limitations.
145 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 2013, Annual Report 2013–14, ACBPS, Canberra, pp. xi, 26.
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Since the closure of the legal domestic tobacco production industry in 2006, there has 
been an ongoing decline in the supply of domestically grown tobacco to the illegal 
market. However, in May 2014, the Australian Taxation Office Operation Garnet search 
warrants, with the assistance of the Australian Federal Police, resulted in the largest-
ever seizure of illegal locally grown tobacco, located in regional Victoria. About 350,000 
mature tobacco plants were seized, which were estimated to have an excise value of 
A$15 million.146
It is highly likely that the illegal tobacco market will remain attractive for serious and 
organised crime groups because of the very large profits that can be made with very low risk.
Tobacco consumption is widely recognised as a major cause of preventable death and 
disease in Australia, with smoking responsible for more drug-related hospitalisations and 
deaths than alcohol and illicit drugs combined.147 Smoking is known to greatly increase 
the risk of many cancers, cardiovascular disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
and other respiratory diseases, peripheral vascular disease and many other serious 
medical conditions. Exposure to second-hand smoke also causes disease and premature 
death in adults and children who do not smoke.
146 Australian Taxation Office 2014, ‘ATO rolls illegal tobacco’, media release, 4 May 2014, viewed 8 January 2015, 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/Media-centre/Media-releases/ATO-rolls-illegal-tobacco>.
147 Department of Health and Ageing 2012, National Tobacco Strategy 2012–2018, DOHA, Canberra.
CASE STUDY 
SEIZURE OF 2 TONNES OF ILLICIT TOBACCO1
In September 2014, the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service seized about 
2.2 tonnes of undeclared loose tobacco, located in a sea cargo container entering 
Australia at the Port of Melbourne.
The illegal tobacco was concealed in aluminium foil packages labelled ‘Pandan Tea’ and 
originated in Vietnam. The revenue that would have been evaded by this attempted 
illegal importation is estimated at almost A$1.5 million.
1 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, ‘ACBPS stops over two tonnes of illicit tobacco at the border’, 
ACBPS Newsroom, 18 September 2014, viewed 12 February 2015, <http://newsroom.customs.gov.au/releases/acbps-
stops-over-two-tonnes-of-illicit-tobacco-at-the-border>.
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Superannuation fraud
Australia’s very large pool of compulsory superannuation savings, totalling 
A$1.62 trillion,148 makes it an attractive target for organised crime. The superannuation 
industry in Australia encompasses a complex array of fund types, ranging from ‘do-it-
yourself’ funds—or self-managed superannuation funds (SMSFs), which are regulated by 
the Australian Taxation Office (ATO)—to large industry and retail funds that are overseen 
by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). Because of the inherent 
complexities of this industry, a range of opportunities exist for fraud, including the theft 
of contributions and fund assets, fraudulent fund investments, non-existent schemes 
and excessive fees charged by advisers.
There are a number of factors that make the Australian superannuation sector 
particularly attractive to organised crime: 
  There is a very large pool of compulsory superannuation savings, with an incremental 
increase in compulsory contributions to 12 per cent due by 2019.
  Many Australians are disengaged from their superannuation, rarely checking the 
balance or performance of their fund, which increases the risk that detection of any 
fraud will only occur upon retirement.
  The complex nature of superannuation regulation in Australia, in which different 
regulatory bodies, including the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC),149 APRA and the ATO all have separate and distinct roles, makes it difficult to 
trace malfeasance in the sector.
The Australian superannuation industry is broadly segmented into funds regulated 
by APRA, including industry funds, corporate funds, retail funds and public sector 
funds, and SMSFs regulated by the ATO. Sixty per cent (or A$970 billion) of the total 
Australian superannuation industry investments are held in APRA-regulated funds, while 
A$506 billion or 31 per cent are held in SMSFs and the remainder are in public sector 
funds and other schemes.150
These investments are equivalent to about 120 per cent of the Australian share market 
capitalisation and 90 per cent of Australia’s annual gross domestic product (GDP).151 
Australian superannuation is expected to achieve continued growth as a result of the tax 
advantages pertaining to it and the compulsory nature of the Superannuation Guarantee, 
and will accumulate almost A$7 trillion (130 per cent of GDP) over the next 25 years.152 
148 As at 9 January 2014.
149 ASIC’s role in connection with the superannuation industry is in relation to regulation of the licensing of financial 
service providers.
150 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, Annual Superannuation Bulletin, June 2013, issued 9 January 2014, 
viewed 13 January 2014, <http://www.apra.gov.au/Super/Publications/Documents/Revised%202013%20Annual%20
Superannuation%20Bulletin%2005-02-14.pdf>.
151 KPMG 2012, Evolving superannuation industry trends, November 2012, viewed 16 December 2013, <www.kpmg.com/
AU/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/evolving-superannuation-industry-trends.pdf>.
152 Australian Government Budget 2012–13, Budget Paper, viewed 16 December 2013, <www.budget.gov.au/2012-13/
content/bp1/html/bp1_bst4-03.htm>.
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Therefore the Australian superannuation industry is a major contributor to the Australian 
financial sector and is a source of wealth attractive for targeting by opportunistic 
individuals and organised crime.
Some of the organised crime networks identified as targeting the Australian market 
have committed similar frauds in numerous overseas jurisdictions and—because of their 
complex global networks of professional advisers, their level of sophistication and their 
ability to adapt their activities in line with regulatory changes—have remained resistant 
to law enforcement and regulatory agency intervention.
Traditionally, SMSFs have been more attractive for fraudulent exploitation than APRA-
regulated funds as they are self-managed and not prudentially regulated, with ultimate 
responsibility and risk associated with investments residing with individual trustees and 
members. The fact that SMSFs hold, on average, the largest balance of superannuation 
assets provides an opportunity for low-volume, high-impact fraud on individual funds 
that may be managed by financially inexperienced individuals.
The defrauding of SMSFs aside, these fund types may also be attractive to organised 
crime as a vehicle for money laundering, as criminals can easily mask large transfers into 
their funds as ‘legitimate’ investment activity. However, the effectiveness of SMSFs as 
an investment vehicle to launder significant amounts of funds is limited by contribution 
caps and benefit payment restrictions.
Recent investigations and intelligence have shown particular similarities in the 
commission of superannuation frauds. These include:
  the use of trusted professionals such as financial planners, who are complicit in the 
fraud
  the deliberate use of investment structures that are complex, multi-layered and 
opaque, and in foreign jurisdictions
  increased use of technology and cybercrime
  the resilience of the syndicate to international law enforcement and regulatory 
agency intervention.
The need for individuals to rely on professional advisers in the superannuation sector 
continues to grow because of ongoing increases in the complexity of the rules and 
regulations affecting this sector. These advisers are at risk of being exposed to coercion 
or exploitation by organised crime because of their in-depth knowledge of the industry 
and their ability to exploit loopholes in controls.
As SMSFs and APRA-regulated superannuation funds transition more to the online 
environment, there is potential for superannuation funds to fall victim to high-tech 
crime. With online processing systems, superannuation funds may fall victim to 
phishing and key logging scams. Cloud computing and storage of the financial details of 
individuals in the cyberspace environment may also represent a risk.
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Stronger Super reforms commenced in July 2013 and included a number of reforms 
to strengthen the governance, integrity and regulatory settings of the superannuation 
system, with particular focus on SMSFs. The reforms included measures to give the 
ATO powers to address wrongdoing and non-compliance by SMSF trustees, capturing 
rollovers to SMSFs as a designated service under the Anti-Money Laundering and 
Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006, and establishing a register of SMSF auditors 
(administered by ASIC).
Further, regulatory safeguards such as the SMSF Member Verification System initiatives 
provide more certainty and transparency in the SMSF registration and rollover process. 
This is in addition to recent enhancements to the ATO’s registration and screening 
systems and the provision of specific instructions from APRA to funds on rollover 
procedures. These reforms have significantly reduced instances of large-scale illegal early 
release schemes conducted using SMSFs.
Because of the large amount of funds involved, infiltration of the Australian 
superannuation system by organised crime, and the associated losses through fraudulent 
activity, would result in more people relying on the social security system in their 
retirement. With the Australian tax base supported by a lower proportion of workers 
compared with retirees, significant increases in the demand for government pensions 
would have serious economic implications for the government.
Significant and continued financial losses in this sector could also lead to a lack of 
confidence in the Australian financial system broadly, and in superannuation in 
particular, leading to a withdrawal of investors from the sector.
Investment and financial market fraud
Australia remains an attractive target for domestic and overseas-based organised crime 
involved in investment and financial market fraud because of its comparatively stable 
economy and Australian investors’ high subscription to share purchases.
Further, the movement of organised crime in Australia from traditional illicit markets 
such as drugs to the investment and financial fraud market may be attributable to a 
perceived lower risk of detection and the substantial illicit profits to be earned.
Investment and financial market fraud, in the context of this report, refers collectively to 
the following types of frauds that target Australians:
  fraudulent investment schemes, such as boiler-room fraud153 (also called cold-call 
investment fraud) and Ponzi schemes,154 which attract victims with promises of high 
financial returns and claims of low risk investment strategies
153 Boiler-room fraud refers to the unsolicited contacting of potential investors who are deliberately given fraudulent, 
false, misleading or deceptive information designed to entice them to buy, sell or retain securities or other 
investments.
154 A Ponzi scheme is a type of fraud that uses money from new investors to make interest payments to earlier investors. 
These schemes typically offer high rates of return and fail when no new investors can be found.
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  manipulation or exploitation of the legitimate share market to artificially raise or 
lower the price of securities for financial benefit—for example, ‘share ramping’ or 
‘pump and dump’155 schemes
  exploitation of financial securities156 to commit fraud or launder or conceal the 
proceeds of crime—for example, off-market share transfers and fraudulent share 
schemes.
Investment fraud
Investment fraud can be a complex, sophisticated and transnational activity that 
generates significant illicit profits with minimal risk of disruption, making it attractive to 
organised crime.
The extent of organised crime involvement in investment fraud, such as boiler-room 
activity, targeting Australia remains difficult to determine, particularly where those 
groups are based offshore. Compounding this difficulty is the fact that victimisation 
from investment fraud is understood to be under-reported, as victims either are too 
embarrassed to report their losses or do not realise that they have been defrauded. It is 
noted that some boiler-room frauds promote investment in fraudulent superannuation 
schemes or defraud individuals of money that they invest under the auspices of their 
self-managed superannuation funds (SMSFs).
Task Force Galilee157 found that the Australian victims of boiler-room investment frauds 
saw the schemes as attractive because of the economic climate at the time, in which 
returns on traditional investments, such as Australian shares and property, were very low 
and investors were seeking higher-yielding investment opportunities.
The majority of investment fraud, such as boiler-room activities, targeting Australians is 
currently understood to be perpetrated from bases offshore. A new domestic investment 
fraud threat however, has recently been identified. Although law enforcement 
investigations have traditionally shown that organised criminal entities promoting 
fraudulent investment schemes in Australia do so without holding an Australian  
Financial Services (AFS) licence,158 in recent cases, organised crime entities have been 
identified seeking to obtain AFS licences in order to give an appearance of legitimacy to 
an illegal undertaking. Unsuspecting investors may believe that due diligence has been 
performed by regulators in the granting of the licence, and that any money they invest 
will therefore be ‘safe’.
155 A ‘share ramping’ or ‘pump and dump’ scheme involves the use of false and misleading information to generate 
investor trading interest to ‘pump’ up the price of a company’s shares. These schemes differ from classic market 
manipulation because of the use of false and misleading information to affect share prices. The schemes differ from 
insider trading as they do not involve the illegal use of inside information.
156 The large numbers of securities on offer in Australia include shares, bonds, derivatives and managed funds.
157 Task Force Galilee was a multi-agency taskforce established to combat and prevent serious and organised investment 
fraud targeting the Australian community.
158 In order to provide financial services to Australian residents, the provider of the services must hold an AFS licence 
issued by ASIC or be an authorised representative of a holder of an AFS licence.
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Regulation in the area of providing financial advice has tightened, but the AFS licensing 
process still has limitations. Although regulators conduct probity checks, which include 
police checks and bankruptcy searches on applicants for an AFS licence, it may be 
difficult to establish previous involvement in fraudulent activity either in Australia or in 
international jurisdictions.
Sectors and industries, such as the mining and resources sector and the biotech and 
pharmaceutical industries, are vulnerable to investment fraud backed by organised 
crime. One of the attributes of these sectors and industries that make them attractive 
for infiltration by organised crime involved in investment fraud is the speculative nature 
of capital raisings. Because of the number of years that it can take from proof of concept 
stage to establishing a viable operation, it is very difficult for investors to determine 
whether or not a promoted product is fraudulent.
Financial market fraud
Recent law enforcement investigations indicate that organised crime is increasingly 
involved in financial market fraud. Some of these frauds are transnational, with separate 
networks in different jurisdictions.
Project Wickenby159 investigations have increased the level of understanding of the  
risks posed to Australian investors by the abusive use of the securities market and 
secrecy jurisdictions. Of primary concern is the opacity of the beneficial ownership of 
Australian-listed shares, which provides the opportunity for organised crime entities 
to hide their involvement in fraudulent and other illegal activities, including money 
laundering and tax evasion.
Given the size of the global foreign exchange market, the volume of transactions, the 
lack of regulation and the volatility of the market, investment fraud syndicates are likely 
to see the foreign exchange market as a vehicle for defrauding investors globally. The 
United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission reports that it has witnessed a 
sharp rise in foreign exchange trading frauds in recent years. The perpetrators of these 
frauds have been seen to use ‘wealth creation’ webcasts, webinars, podcasts, emails 
and other online seminars on the Internet to solicit clients worldwide. One scheme in 
particular accepted at least US$53 million from at least 960 clients worldwide, including 
investors in Australia.160
Globalisation and innovation will continue to result in the creation of new investment 
products, services and technologies that may be used to facilitate investment and 
financial market fraud in the future.
159 Project Wickenby is a cross-agency taskforce designed to strengthen national law enforcement and Australian 
Taxation Office (ATO) compliance activities against taxation fraud. Led by the ATO, Project Wickenby includes the 
Australian Crime Commission, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 
the Attorney-General’s Department, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, the Australian 
Government Solicitor and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.
160 United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Release: PR6353-12, 19 September 2012, viewed 9 January 
2014, <http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6353-12>.
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Investment and financial market fraud can undermine the integrity and reputation of 
financial markets and discourage international investment in Australian securities, which 
in turn adversely affects the Australian economy.
At the social level, harm is caused by the financial hardship incurred when victims are 
manipulated to invest their money in a fraud. The end result for victims can include 
chronic financial insecurity; depletion of personal wealth; sudden reliance on welfare; 
housing problems and even homelessness; mental illness; and, in extreme cases, self-
harm and suicide. Investors who lose money that is uncompensated may come to lack 
confidence in the financial system and distrust government and regulators, and may be 
less likely to participate in the financial system in the future, which also has an impact on 
the economy.
Visa and migration fraud
Visa and migration fraud is an illicit market that has not previously been addressed in 
Organised Crime in Australia 2013. Collaborative work between the Australian Crime 
Commission and the Department of Immigration and Border Protection has identified 
that organised crime has infiltrated and exploited the visa and migration fraud market, 
and will continue to do so. Visa and migration fraud may be linked to human trafficking 
or maritime people smuggling, both of which are dealt with in the ‘Crimes against the 
person’ section of this report.
Visa and migration fraud occurs when a visa is issued on fraudulent or false grounds. It 
occurs in two main forms:
  The use of legitimate visas obtained fraudulently—where visa recipients, or agents 
acting on their behalf, make false claims to meet visa requirements. Both permanent 
and temporary visa classes are used to gain unlawful entry into Australia, including 
partner visas, Electronic Travel Authorities, skilled temporary migration (457) visas, 
student visas, working holiday makers and tourist visas.
  The use of illegitimate or illegal visas and passports (document fraud).
Visa and migration fraud can be complex, systemic and organised, involving a range of 
complicit individuals—including the applicants themselves—and other entities such as 
registered migration agents and business operators.
Significant profits can be made from visa and migration fraud, with facilitators arranging 
entry to and/or stay in Australia on visas obtained on fraudulent or false grounds. 
Organised crime groups and other known criminal entities are exploiting vulnerabilities 
associated with some visa subclasses, and are using false or fraudulent documentation 
to fulfil visa requirements. Visa and migration fraud is being used by organised crime as a 
means of obtaining cheap labour and potentially expanding their criminal networks; this 
is done by facilitating unlawful entry, visa extensions and employment for individuals, 
while extorting, underpaying and exploiting employees.
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Some registered migration agents use their detailed knowledge of Australian visa and 
migration processes to exploit vulnerabilities in the system to facilitate unlawful entry 
into Australia, and make significant profits by charging inflated fees for services.
Visa and migration fraud has the potential to pose a significant threat to Australia’s 
migration system. It is also a possible threat to Australia’s national security, given that 
true identities are often difficult to establish when individuals arrive in Australia with 
fraudulent documentation and false identities.
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CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON
Human trafficking and slavery
Human trafficking is the act of recruiting, transporting, transferring, harbouring or 
receiving a person by means of the threat or use of force, deception, coercion or abuse 
of power, for the purpose of exploitation, including sexual and labour exploitation, and 
the harvesting of body organs.
Human trafficking is a very different crime from people smuggling. In Australia the 
term ‘human trafficking and slavery’ is used to encompass a range of crimes, including 
those in which a person is moved domestically or transnationally for the purposes 
of exploitation, as well as those in which a person already in Australia is subjected to 
exploitative practices such as slavery and slavery-like practices, including servitude, 
forced labour and forced marriage. The link between these crimes is that a person’s 
freedom and ability to make choices for themselves are substantially constrained, 
whether that is because of the use of coercion, threat or deception, or because the 
powers of ‘ownership’ have been exercised over them. In contrast, people smuggling is 
the organised, irregular movement of people across borders, usually on a payment-for-
service basis, and does not usually involve the ongoing exploitation of the victim by the 
offender.
The clandestine nature of human trafficking, along with probable high levels of under-
reporting and low levels of recognition, including through self-identification, means that 
there is little reliable data about the nature and extent of human trafficking at a global, 
regional or domestic level. However, there is general consensus that human trafficking 
affects almost every country in the world, whether as a source, transit or destination 
country, or as a combination of these.
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Opportunities to traffic people into, or exploit people within, Australia are curtailed 
by strong migration controls, geographic isolation and a high degree of regulation, 
compliance and enforcement. Australia’s comprehensive whole-of-government strategy 
to combat human trafficking and slavery also helps to ensure that Australia is a hostile 
environment for offenders. However, Australia is traditionally a destination country 
for people trafficked from Asia—particularly from Thailand, the Republic of Korea and 
Malaysia—and is potentially a source country in relation to forced marriage.
Historically, the majority of human trafficking and slavery matters investigated in 
Australia have related to women working in the sex industry. However, in recent years, 
cases of men and women exploited in a range of other industry sectors—such as 
hospitality, agriculture and construction—have increasingly been identified. In 2013–14, 
35 per cent of investigations conducted by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) related 
to forms of labour exploitation not involving the sex industry. Of the 21 clients referred 
to the Support for Trafficked People Program in 2013–14, 62 per cent experienced 
exploitation other than in the sex industry.161
In 2013–14, the AFP commenced 10 new investigations relating to forced marriage. 
Three of these investigations related to marriages that had already taken place. 
Operational evidence has shown that forced marriage matters require a different 
investigative approach from other human trafficking and slavery matters. The forced 
marriage referrals received to date have primarily involved Australian citizens under the 
age of 18, with relatives alleged to have arranged, or to be arranging, a marriage for 
them overseas without their full and free consent.162
Maritime people smuggling
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that at the 
end of 2013 there were 51.2 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, including 
33.3 million people internally displaced163 as the result of conflict.164 Internally displaced 
people are targets for people smugglers worldwide, and in recent years Australia has 
been seen as an attractive destination because of its geographic location and positive 
economic, political and social environment. It is also one of the few countries in the 
region that is a signatory to the Refugee Convention.165
161 Australian Government 2014, Trafficking in persons: the Australian Government response, 1 July 2013–30 June 
2014, Sixth Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Human Trafficking and Slavery, Australian Government, 
Canberra.
162 ibid.
163 For the purposes of United Nations statistics, internally displaced persons are people or groups of individuals who 
have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of armed conflict and who have not 
crossed an international border.
164 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2014, UNHCR global trends 2013 (online), viewed 23 January 2015, 
<http://unhcr.org/trends2013/>.
165 Crock, M & Ghezelbash, D 2010, ‘Do loose lips bring ships?’, Griffith Law Review, vol.19, no. 2, pp. 238–87.
79
ORGANISED CRIME IN AUSTRALIA 2015 
AUSTRALIAN CRIME COMMISSION
There are only two possible means of entry into Australia—by air or by sea. People 
smuggling occurs through both streams, but people smuggling by air is more difficult, as 
it generally requires some form of fraudulent documentation, access to corrupt officials 
en route, or both.166 The most visible form of people smuggling to Australia occurs by 
sea. Maritime people smuggling is usually one stage of a much larger journey, also 
involving land and air movements.167
Maritime people smuggling voyages are particularly dangerous and have resulted in 
substantial loss of life at sea. Conditions during the journey may be crowded and a 
lack of hygiene on board can result in the spread of disease.168 Journeys may require 
travel through rough seas in boats that are unseaworthy, sinking without the means for 
passengers (who may not have been provided with life vests) to signal for help.169
Maritime people smuggling is generally viewed as a high profit and low risk venture170 
because of the relatively low risk of detection, arrest and prosecution compared with 
other activities undertaken by transnational organised crime groups.171 It is generally 
carried out by flexible criminal groups or individuals, operating in repeated contractual 
arrangements, rather than in structured hierarchies.172
At the peak of maritime people smuggling activity in 2012 and 2013 (see Table 2), high 
demand meant that illegal maritime arrivals (IMAs) on board suspected illegal entry 
vessels (SIEVs) were well served by established people smugglers and a few opportunists. 
However, the countermeasures implemented under the Regional Resettlement 
Agreement and Operation Sovereign Borders have effectively suppressed that demand.
Table 2: SIEVs and IMAs by calendar year, 2008–2015173
Year Number of SIEVs
Number of IMAs 
(excluding crew)
2008 7 161
2009 55 2,574
2010 138 6,650
2011 70 4,622
2012 276 17,072
2013 302 20,719
2014 1 168
2015 (as at 28/02/2015) 0 0
166 Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers 2012, Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers, Australian Government, 
Canberra.
167 ibid.
168 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2011, Issue paper: smuggling of migrants by sea, UNODC, Vienna.
169 ibid.
170 Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers 2012, Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers, Australian Government, 
Canberra.
171 INTERPOL Fact Sheet, People smuggling, <http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Trafficking-in-human-beings/People-
smuggling>.
172 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2011, Issue paper: smuggling of migrants by sea, UNODC, Vienna.
173 Data provided by Australian Customs and Border Protection Service.
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On-water operations, intergovernmental cooperation, regional processing centres and 
strategic messaging campaigns have convinced most potential illegal immigrants not 
to join a maritime venture to Australia. Despite the results under Operation Sovereign 
Borders, the maritime people smuggling threat is enduring.
Child sex offences
Organised child sex offending in Australia is different from that seen in other countries, 
particularly in South East Asia and Eastern Europe. Australia is not regarded as a major 
source of children or material for organised child sex offending. In Australia there is not 
the same nature or scale of involvement of organised crime groups that have child sexual 
abuse as the sole or a major criminal activity and source of profit for the group.
Organised child sex offending in Australia is also unlikely to involve the more extreme 
aspects of child sexual abuse facilitated by overseas organised crime groups, including 
the abduction, trafficking and sale of children. In Australia, it is more likely to involve 
Australian perpetrators sourcing children and material from like-minded individuals 
based in Australia, or from overseas-based markets run and facilitated by organised 
crime groups.
The true extent of child sexual abuse in Australia is unknown, although statistics can give 
some insight. In 2012, there were 6,729 recorded victims of sexual assault aged 0–14.174 
However, it is widely acknowledged that cases of child sexual abuse are chronically 
under-reported. Determining the scale of organised child sex offending is further 
complicated by Australian perpetrators abusing children overseas, as is the case with 
child sexual exploitation in travel and tourism.
Child sexual offenders are motivated by a diverse range of sexual attractions towards 
children and young people, spanning a broad continuum. This spectrum can range from 
offenders who view child exploitation material (CEM) online that has been produced by 
others, to offenders who interact with children and young people online for immediate 
sexual gratification, to persistent predators who groom children and young people online 
over time in order to lay the foundations for eventual sexual abuse in the physical world.
The range of contexts in which child sexual assault takes place varies. Through 
examination of subject matter literature, the Australian Institute of Family Studies has 
identified seven categories of child sexual assault perpetration. These are intrafamilial, 
adolescent (child-on-child), authority-figure (includes institutionalised abuse), stranger, 
online, Indigenous or other minority groups, and female perpetrators.175 
174 Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013, ‘Victims, sex and age group by selected offences—state and territory’, in 
Recorded crime victims, Australia, 4510.0, ABS, Canberra, available at: <http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/
DetailsPage/4510.02012?OpenDocument>.
175 Australian Institute of Family Studies 2013, Summary for ANZPAA Child Protection Working Group feedback: AIFS and 
PwC gap analysis and recommendations to reduce child sex offending, AIFS, Canberra.
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Technology is continuing to be a significant enabler for child sex offences, with new 
forms of exploitation emerging such as ‘made-to-order’ sexual abuse material, real-time 
sexual exploitation of children through pay-per-view services, and the emerging issue 
of ‘sextortion’. Sextortion occurs when offenders coerce or deceive children and young 
people into providing sexually compromising imagery, which is then used as a tool to 
extort further CEM from victims.
Offenders are also increasingly exploiting the use of social media services and other 
online platforms (such as online gaming) to coerce victims to perform sexual acts in the 
‘virtual’ environment online, and to groom children and young people for the purpose 
of conducting sexual acts. Given the growing importance of online activities in the lives 
of children and young people around the world (for educational, entertainment and 
social purposes), as well as the increasing uptake of the Internet in developing countries, 
the threat of child exploitation emanating from the online environment will continue to 
increase (see the case study above).
CASE STUDY 
AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE OPERATION 
CONQUEROR
In January 2013, the Australian Federal Police identified persons of interest across 
Australia involved in a peer-to-peer file sharing network circulating CEM.
As a result of Operation Conqueror, to date a total of 40 search warrants have been 
executed and 25 arrests have been made. Offenders have been charged with offences 
that include producing, accessing, transmitting and making available CEM. It is estimated 
that, after further forensic analysis, millions of items of CEM will have been seized.1
1 Australian Federal Police 2013, ‘Further AFP arrests in child sexual exploitation cases’, media release, 28 March 2013, 
<http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/news/afp/2013/march/further-afp-arrests-in-child-sexual-exploitation-cases>.
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In addition, children and young people are adopting new technology earlier and at 
a greater rate, and thus unwittingly exposing themselves to online predators to an 
unprecedented degree. This includes child sexual exploitation for both private and 
commercial purposes.176 Increased availability of high-speed Internet in the developing 
world is also expanding the sources of real-time CEM and increasing the number of 
children who can be victimised.
The online exploitation of children is a growing international concern, with advances 
in technology facilitating abuse. Darknets (and their online users) facilitating the 
exchange of CEM are concealed within freely available ‘onion networks’ such as The 
Onion Router (TOR), which consists of numerous relay servers and layers of encryption. 
Cheap prices for information and communication technology devices and easy Internet 
access permit sex offenders to have unprecedented access to materials and an online 
community to affirm their abusive and exploitative behaviour. Online services have also 
enabled offenders to share methodologies and experiences with like-minded individuals 
internationally, and to support the transnational exploitation of children. The ability to 
do this from a home environment also allows offenders to invest many hours in planning 
and undertaking activities to reduce the evidence of their offending online.
An emerging problem for Australia is the growth of youth gang and group culture that 
can involve the routine use of sexual violence against girls who associate with, or join, 
gangs. This behaviour is being seen in North America and the United Kingdom, where 
girls are often forced or coerced into participating in a range of sexual activities with 
male gang members, including sex with multiple partners at the same time or in quick 
succession.177 This abuse can occur as part of initiation processes for male members, as 
displays of power, or for commercial exploitation.178 In all of these situations, children are 
both the victims and the perpetrators of child sexual abuse.
Australia has in place an extensive legislative framework to prevent, investigate and 
prosecute all forms of child sexual exploitation, including offences that occur within 
Australia and those committed by Australian citizens and residents overseas. In April 
2010, reforms were introduced to strengthen laws against child exploitation online and 
overseas. The reforms also reinforced the offences for using a carriage service (including 
the Internet) for child pornography or child abuse material.
The harm caused by child sexual abuse and organised child sex offending is complex. 
Depending on the circumstances of the abuse, an individual victim can experience severe 
life-long harm. Research demonstrates that psychological, physical and behavioural 
harms may be more severe, extensive or long-lasting when the abuse involves the 
elements that are indicative of organised abuse. Family environments can also be 
severely damaged, which causes additional harm to victims.
176 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2013, UN crime body to combat online child abuse, viewed 2 December 
2014, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2013/September/un-crime-body-to-combatonline-child-abuse.
html>.
177 Dorais, M & Corriveau, P 2009, Gangs and girls: understanding juvenile prostitution, McGill University Press, Montreal, 
pp. 29–30.
178 Berelowitz, S, Firmin, C, Edwards, G & Gulyurtlu, S 2012, I thought I was the only one. The only one in the world: the 
Office of the Children’s Commissioner’s Inquiry into Child Sexual Exploitation in Gang and Groups (Interim Report), 
Office of the Children’s Commissioner (UK), London, pp. 34–46.
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THE OUTLOOK
What will the organised crime environment look like 
over the next two years?
The Australian serious and organised crime environment will continue to evolve over the 
next two years. What we are likely to see is the further integration of organised crime 
into legitimate markets, both to engage in criminal activities and to attempt to provide 
a façade of legitimacy for illicit operations. Organised crime will continue to adapt 
their criminal business model, to expand their use of flexible networked structures, 
to enhance their resilience and enable adaptive operations across international and 
domestic jurisdictions. They will continue to develop their capabilities, including 
adopting innovative information and communications technologies to support their 
activities. Australian law enforcement will increasingly look at the evolving challenges 
posed by the nexus between organised crime and terrorism over the next two years.
The use of professional facilitators to successfully exploit business structures on behalf 
of organised crime will remain a key problem, as lawyers, accountants and trust and 
company service providers are in large part not captured by Australia’s Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing regime. As a result, they do not have the 
same customer due diligence or ‘suspicious matter’ reporting obligations as financial 
institutions. This issue is under consideration as part of the statutory review of the 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006, which is expected 
to culminate in a report and recommendations to the Australian Government in 2015. 
Professional facilitators will continue to perform an important role in the organised crime 
business model while they remain outside the Australian Anti-Money Laundering and 
Counter-Terrorism Financing regime.
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The use of technology and the cyber environment by the majority of the community has 
opened new gateways for innovative methods of criminal targeting and compromise. The 
online culture of society today can provide organised crime with opportunities to engage 
in criminal activities anonymously and remotely. Our reliance on technology in everyday 
life means that the online environment, in particular, provides organised crime with a 
diverse pool of Australian victims. As organised crime becomes smarter at exploiting 
technology and members of the community increase their reliance on mobile devices, 
there is likely to be an increased susceptibility to compromise. Failure to install electronic 
security measures on mobile devices (such as phones and tablets) will remain an issue, 
as mobile devices are just as susceptible to attack as laptops and desktop computers.
The demand for certain illegal commodities, such as drugs, is ongoing and in the 
next two years will continue to dominate organised crime markets. Organised crime 
will continue to seek to satisfy this demand. The demand for methylamphetamine is 
currently being met by a combination of imported and domestically produced product, 
suggesting greater involvement by transnational serious and organised crime groups. 
The continuing high threat of the methylamphetamine market, and the effects it has on 
users, families, health services and the safety of the public, demonstrate the impact of 
organised crime in the community.
Where there are proceeds of crime, there will always be a need for money laundering. 
The banking and the alternative remittance sectors will continue to be major money 
laundering channels. The use of other methods of remittance, such as informal value 
transfer systems, to facilitate international money laundering is increasing. There are also 
indications that trade-based money laundering methodologies are being increasingly 
used as one component or stage of a money laundering process employed by global 
networks.
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